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ABSTRACT 
Regional proficiency is a critical capability in irregular warfare (IW).  In preparation for 
increased engagement in irregular warfare, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Military Services made several significant improvements in developing regional 
proficiency.  While the DoD is attempting to create a new capability in the majority of 
the Total Force, Special Forces was created to succeed in an IW environment.  As a result 
of its design, Special Forces valued and developed regional proficiency long before this 
became topical in DoD.  Oddly, the last decade of overseas contingency operations that 
spurred interest in regional proficiency in DoD overall has also threatened regional 
proficiency development in Special Forces.  An analysis of Special Forces training and 
development reveals that the Special Forces’ primary means of developing regional 
proficiency is through deployment experience.  While the Special Forces Groups are 
regionally aligned, several have consistently deployed outside of their Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) to support combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  A survey 
and a series of interviews were conducted to determine the state of regional proficiency 
interest in Special Forces.  Through survey analysis, several trends were identified.  With 
this information, this thesis concludes with a suggested strategy to improve regional 
proficiency in Special Forces non-commissioned officers (NCOs).   
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  




In 2001, Afghanistan suddenly became the most interesting place on Earth for the 
United States defense establishment.  Raised from obscurity to the highest national 
priority, Afghanistan became the primary interest for our national security organizations.  
People with knowledge and experience in Afghanistan were suddenly some of the most 
valuable resources in the federal government.  The United States needed people with field 
experience and knowledge of the region to spearhead operations in Afghanistan.  The 5
th
 
Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)) was the Special Forces unit aligned with the 
region that included Afghanistan.  Then-COL Mulholland, the commander of 5
th
 SFG(A) 
at the time, stated that Special Forces lacked “precise knowledge” on Afghanistan 
because there had been little association with the country since the 1980s.2   
Only a few men had the regional and operational expertise required to conduct the 
operation in Afghanistan.  Gary Schroen, a man about to retire from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), was the most qualified of a very small group.  Over the 
course of a career, Schroen had developed extensive regional knowledge of Afghanistan 
and had personally dealt with many of the Northern Alliance commanders.3  Had the 
timing of 9/11 been different, Schroen could have retired and there would have been no 
                                                 
1 United States Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM Homepage,” accessed 30 November 2011, 
http://www.socom.mil/default.aspx. 
2 John Mulholland, “Interview: Colonel John Mulholland,” Frontline: Campaign Against Terror, 
accessed 10 April 2011, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/mulholland.html. 
3 Gary Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War On Terror in 
Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, 2006), 17. 
 2 
one with the same ability within the federal government capable of executing the required 
mission.  The nation was lucky to have Gary Schroen.   
Another example of luck is found in the British example of T.E. Lawrence.  T.E. 
Lawrence was already an accomplished scholar on Arabia when World War I erupted.  
Lawrence escaped duties as a desk officer and became the most accomplished 
unconventional warrior of modern times by being a military advisor to the Arab tribes.4  
What is notable about both cases is that the person’s regional expertise went largely 
unrecognized until a crisis manifested.  In the face of crisis, what was largely obscure 
knowledge can become one of the most significant items in a military strategy.  It was 
only by luck that both nations had these types of individuals at hand at the right time.  
The United States should not have to depend on luck to meet its national security needs. 
No one can predict where the next crisis might occur.  Fortunately, U.S. Army 
Special Forces already maintains a global presence in many of the world’s “hot spots.”  
Regional proficiency is a fundamental aspect of Special Forces’ strategic value and it 
should be deliberately developed in Special Forces.  The average Special Forces Soldier 
is intelligent, intellectually curious and constantly seeking to better himself.  As an 
example, despite a high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) in Afghanistan that frequently 
involved direct combat engagements, several of the Special Forces Non-Commissioned 
Officers (NCOs) on my Special Forces Operational Detachment–A (SFODA) were 
enrolled in online college courses.  Given their inherent intelligence and perseverance, 
these NCO’s completed their academic workload, even if some of the tests were 
interrupted by insurgent rocket attacks on our small forward operating base (FOB).  
Unfortunately, these studies were on American history and the Civil War.  It made me 
wonder how much more effective and efficient Special Forces Soldiers could be if they 
earned college credit while they studied the regions they were likely to deploy to.  It is 
my firm belief that if properly enabled, Special Forces can become the regional experts 
that the nation will need in the future. 
                                                 
4 Michael Korda, Hero: The Life and Legend of Lawrence of Arabia (New York: HarperCollins, 
2010). 
 3 
Equally influential in the genesis of this thesis was a visit to my Special Forces 
battalion by ADM Eric Olson, then-Commander, United States Special Operations 
Commander (USSOCOM).  During his concluding comments to the gathered battalion 
leadership, ADM Olson observed that the last decade of combat caused an evolution 
within the Department of Defense and Special Operations Forces in particular.  ADM 
Olson left us with these closing remarks, “General Purpose Forces are looking more like 
SOF and SOF are looking more like General Purpose Forces.  Very soon there needs to 
be a conversation about what makes SOF SOF.”5  It is my hope that this thesis offers a 
small contribution to that conversation.   
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
President Kennedy understood the indirect approach; he 
understood the focus had to be on the population with the primary goal of 
working together with host nation partners to combat violent, extremist 
organizations and home grown insurgents with unique local solutions. 
Their solutions…It is the trademark of the Green Beret, and part of 
President Kennedy's legacy.  He understood that specially trained forces 
could achieve the balance of lethal force and assistance to populations that 
was required to create enduring successes on a global scale. 
—BG Edward Reeder, Commander, USASFC(A)6 
Special Forces’ roots are in unconventional warfare and its requirement to work 
by, with or through irregular forces.7  This requires every Special Forces (SF) Soldier to 
have some regional proficiency.  The theoretical framework for this research seeks to 
determine how an increased level of regional proficiency might be imparted to current 
and future Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).   
My overarching hypothesis is that increasing regional proficiency will enhance a 
Special Forces NCO’s effectiveness.  This hypothesis is based on three items.  First, 
regional proficiency makes a soldier more effective in irregular warfare (IW).  Second, 
                                                 
5 Eric Olson, remarks to 1-10
th
 SFG(A) leadership paraphrased by author, Panzer Kaserne,  Germany, 
2009.  
6 Edward Reeder, Jr., “John F. Kennedy Commemoration Ceremony Remarks” (speech, Arlington, 
VA, 17 November 2011). 
7 Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces 
Unconventional Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2008), 1–2. 
 4 
Special Forces is designed to be effective at irregular warfare.  Third, Special Forces 
NCOs are capable of developing a high level of regional proficiency.   
The importance of regional proficiency is found in several of the Department of 
Defense’s principal documents on IW.  Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.7 
states that “IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare” and requires the 
improvement of Department of Defense proficiency in IW.8  With regard to regional 
proficiency in particular, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 (IW 
JOC, v. 2.0) highlights this with the statement, “The joint force must develop a thorough 
appreciation of the specific socio-cultural, political, religious, economic, and military 
factors involved and a detailed portrait of key segments of the population, including those 
who wield most influence in the society.”9  From this it can be concluded that DoD 
believes that regional proficiency is a vital skill for IW.   
IW is the form of conflict that Special Forces is designed to excel in.  
Additionally, Special Forces’ approach is in accordance with DoD’s belief that regional 
proficiency is necessary for successful conduct of IW.  Special Forces’ requirement for 
regional proficiency is explicitly stated within its doctrine.  FM 3-05.20 Special Forces 
Operations states: 
Special Forces units are regionally oriented to ensure they have the 
resident skills and knowledge of the belief, art, morals, law, custom, and 
any other capabilities and habits of a specific region to allow them to 
influence their [host nation] HN counterparts. This understanding of the 
region extends into the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, 
information, and physical environment systems within that region and how 
they apply to military operations.10   
From doctrine alone, it can be decisively concluded that regional proficiency is an 
important subject for Special Forces.  Since regional proficiency is integral to Special 
Forces, improving regional proficiency should be researched.   
                                                 
8 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (December 2008), 2.  
9 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW): Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operating 
Concept (JOC), Version 2.0 (17 May 2010), 25, emphasis added. 
10 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2011), 3–26. 
 5 
While regional proficiency is important to the entire Regiment, Special Forces 
NCOs are uniquely suited to be the targeted population for enhanced regional 
proficiency.  Special Forces NCOs serve the longest periods of time on a Special Forces 
Operational Detachment A (SFODA).  According to doctrine, the SFODA “is the primary 
Special Forces operational unit and the building block for Special Forces operations… 
[and] is designed to organize, equip, train, advise or direct, and support indigenous 
military or paramilitary forces.”11  An SFODA is composed of ten Special Forces NCOs, 
one Special Forces Warrant Officer, and one Special Forces Officer.  While on an 
SFODA, SF NCOs have the opportunity to focus on a specific region and to conduct 
multiple deployments to the same region.  This provides an excellent opportunity to 
specialize.  Furthermore, while they are detachment members, Special Forces NCOs have 
the best opportunity to exploit the regional proficiency education they have received 
since they are most often the ones actually engaging with the population.   
Some regional education is already programmed into the Special Forces NCOs’ 
development program.  The regional education provided during initial training and during 
established PME will be examined.  This thesis will also examine how Special Forces 
NCOs’ experiences and on-the-job-training (OJT) could translate into acquired regional 
proficiency.  Finally, this thesis will also determine how additional regional proficiency 
education could be applied to the current SF NCO career path. 
C. BACKGROUND 
The requirement for regional proficiency is widely recognized within the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  Specifically defining and measuring regional proficiency, 
however, proves to be a complicated task and is currently under development.12  Even 
prior to the publication of The Department of Defense Language, Regional Expertise and 
Culture Capabilities Strategic Plan (referred to in this thesis as the Strategic Plan), each 
                                                 
11 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3–20. 
12 Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee On Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap: Bearing the Burden For 
Today's Educational Shortcomings (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2010), accessed 18 February 2011, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg61632/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg61632.pdf, 52. 
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Service was already taking steps to improve regional proficiency.13  Many of these 
programs and discussions are focused on developing the total force (i.e., every Soldier, 
Sailor, Airman and Marine).  Even though the Army describes Special Forces as both 
cultural professionals and foreign language professionals, the discussions within the 
Service regarding regional specialists are usually limited to and focus on Foreign Area 
Officers (FAO), cryptologists and linguists. Special Forces Soldiers are omitted from the 
Service-level discussion.14  Many of the Services, to include the Army, view expanding 
FAO billets as a way to meet regional specialist needs.  Omission of Special Forces from 
these discussions is surprising since after FAOs, Special Forces and other elements of 
United States Army Special Operations Forces (USASOC) best meet the descriptions of 
Regional Proficiency skill level (RP) 3 and below.   
RP is a new ranking system developed by the Defense Language Office (DLO) 
and is designed to numerically rate a person’s experience in a region.  This is to be 
assessed through the Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool (RPAT).  A key concept of 
the RPAT is that it is not a test.  Rather, it is a tool used to judge an intangible ability that 
is not readily evaluated by performance measures.   Like many things in the military 
(e.g., leadership potential, awards, etc.), procedures and guidelines can be applied to 
assist in this judgment.  The RPAT methodology allows DoD to express regional 
proficiency in a numerical value that its DoD personnel systems can accept.  This will 
permit the tracking and management of regional proficiency within DoD.15     
Regional proficiency is an inherent requirement for the Special Forces’ mission 
set.  In the 2011 SOCOM Posture Statement, Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander, United 
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), stated, “Understanding the 
operational context of the environments in which we operate is a hallmark of SOF… and 
                                                 
13 Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee On Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap: Bearing the Burden For 
Today's Educational Shortcomings, 30–31. 
14 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy 
(Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2009), accessed 21 February 2011, 
http://www.almc.army.mil/ALU_CULTURE/docs/ARMYCULTURESTRATEGY-01DEC09.pdf, 71. 
15 Gary Bauleke, Associate Director, Operations and Capability, Defense Language Office, 
conversation with the author, 22 November 2012. 
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understanding the value of ‘micro-regional expertise allows SOF” to succeed.16  Yet, 
while SOF may be able to focus on regions, SOCOM is relying on the Services to 
develop their own regional proficiency strategies applicable to their respective SOF 
elements.17 
Few would probably dispute that regional proficiency is more integral to Special 
Forces than to other SOF elements outside of United States Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC).  According to FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations, “Regional 
orientation is the hallmark of Special Forces Soldiers and units, with each of the five 
Regular Army and two [Army National Guard] ARNG Special Forces groups regionally 
aligned with a [Geographical Combatant Command] GCC.”18   Despite this, Special 
Forces Soldiers and particularly Special Forces NCOs, do not have a structured program 
for improving their regional proficiency during their careers.  Much of a Special Forces 
NCO’s education on regional proficiency occurs during the Special Forces Qualification 
Course (SFQC) language phase.  This is insufficient.  A Needs Assessment conducted by 
Norwich University in 2010 determined that the SFQC provided only a limited amount of 
cultural training and no regional education.  For instance, in January 2011, six Russian 
language students were tested on the nation-states of Europe.  None of the six was able to 
correctly label more than 50% of the countries.19    
Upon graduation, a Special Forces NCO is expected to improve his knowledge 
through self-study and on-the-job-training (OJT).  This reliance on OJT is captured in FM 
3-05.20, Special Forces Operations with the phrase, “Formal training and cultural 
immersion during repeated deployments are the vehicles for developing” regional 
                                                 
16 Eric Olson, 2011 SOCOM Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2011), accessed 19 
November 2011, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/030311olson.pdf, 15. 
17 William McRaven, Written Statement to the Senate, Advanced Policy Questions for Vice Admiral 
William H. McRaven, USN: Nominee for Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Senate 
Confirmation Hearing, 28 June 2011, 35–36. 
18 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3-5. 
19 David Walton, Department Chief, Directorate of Regional Studies and Education (DRSE), 
JKFSWCS, correspondence with author, 10 March 2011. 
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proficiency.20  As a result of this reliance on OJT, regional proficiency is a mixed bag.  
Some units do it well.  Other units do it poorly.   
Attempts are being made to address this training and education capability gap.  
The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 
(USAJFKSWCS, from here on referred to as SWCS) recently created the Intermediate 
Regional Studies (IRS).  The first pilot course was completed in February 2011 and was 
called the Intermediate Language and Culture Course.  Since then, the course has been 
split into an Intermediate Language Course and Intermediate Regional Studies.  While 
not a part of the SFQC, the majority of the students were recent SFQC graduates.21  The 
purpose of this course is “to prepare graduates with a systems approach to understanding 
their area of interest to better affect the battle space.”22  The course seeks to give 
graduates the tools needed to analyze cultures and then apply these to their assigned 
region.  In this manner, the course attempts to improve all three components of cultural 
capability.   
These efforts to improve regional proficiency in USASOC are separate from the 
Service-level initiatives.  The motivation for the reform within SWCS originated with 
requests by leaders in the Special Forces Regiment and the Theater Special Operations 
Commands (TSOCs).  As a result, these efforts are USASOC centric and are not intended 
to meet DoD’s RP guidelines.  Examples of this separated effort and different goals are 
found in the description of the skill level identifiers that are awarded to graduates of the 
ILC.  For instance, the Intermediate Level Language Skills identifier, Professional 
Development Skill Identifier (PDSI) D5E, requires an Interagency Language Roundtable 
(ILR) score of 2/2, completion of ILC, or “6 semester hours [received] from a Regionally 
Accredited College/University in Cultural Studies associated with the language of the 
[assigned language] or an equivalent College/University abroad.”  The Advanced Level 
Language Skills identifier, PDSI D5F, requires an ILR score of 3/3, presumes the 
                                                 
20 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3–26. 
21 Directorate of Regional Studies and Education, ILC Data Review (Pilot I: Jan.-Feb. 2011) (data 
review, JFKSWCS, 2011), 1.  
22 Kristin Richmond, Intermediate Language & Culture: Analysis & Recommendations (report, 
Tailored Training Programs, LLC, 2011), 3. 
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individual meets the requirements of PDSI D5E, and “have a minimum of two years 
operational experience and two deployments in the AOR of their assigned language at the 
SOF tactical element level.”  While this reform and these PDSI incentives will increase 
regional proficiency, they do not fully address the expectations of RP or meet the intent 
of this thesis to provide continued regional proficiency education for Special Forces 
Soldiers. 23    
D. DEFINITIONS.  WHAT AM I TALKING ABOUT? 
Q: What do you get when you put two anthropologists in a room? 
A: Three definitions of culture!24 
Unfortunately, this joke is based in truth.  Culture and most things related to 
culture tend to be nebulous concepts that refuse to be firmly nailed down.  This proved a 
constant source of difficulty during research for this thesis.  Not only do anthropologists 
and other culture professionals struggle with defining culture, but the Department of 
Defense is also having difficulty in creating a definitive lexicon for talking about this 
subject.  Brian Selmeski in his paper, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence,” provides a 
good survey of cultural terms that were in fashion in 2007.25  Since then, even more 
terms have arisen.  Each Service is approaching the “developing cultural capability” 
problem in a slightly different way and as a result different terms or terms with different 
meanings are in use among the different Services.  The DoD has identified this problem 
and is taking measures to address it.26  For clarity within this thesis, when feasible, 
definitions are drawn from the highest authority within DoD.   
                                                 
 23 David Walton, Department Chief, Directorate of Regional Studies and Education (DRSE), 
JKFSWCS, correspondence with author, 10 March 2011. 
24 Brian R. Selmeski, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence: core concepts and individual 
development,” AFCLC Contract Report 2007-01 (16 May 2007), 3. 
25 Brian R. Selmeski, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence: core concepts and individual 
development,” 4-5. Example list of terms: cultural savvy, cultural astuteness, cultural appreciation, cultural 
literacy, cultural adaptability, cultural or human terrain, cultural expertise, cultural competency, cultural 
awareness, cultural intelligence, cultural understanding 
26 Department of Defense, “Regional and Cultural Expertise: Building a DoD Framework to Meet 
National Defense Challenges,” Department of Defense June 2007 Summit: DoD Regional and Cultural 
Capabilities, the Way Ahead (October 2007), 7. 
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As noted in the joke above, defining culture is a problem that still plagues 
professionals to this day.  This thesis will not add to that debate.  Rather, for the purposes 
of this thesis, the definition presented in the Army Culture and Foreign Language 
Strategy will be used.  In this publication, culture is defined as: 
The set of distinctive features of a society or group, including but not 
limited to values, beliefs, and norms, that ties together members of that 
society or group and that drives action and behavior.27 
With culture defined, here is the way this thesis defines regional proficiency.  
Regional proficiency, according to the Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 
5160.70 is:  
An individual’s awareness and understanding of the historical, political, 
cultural (including linguistic and religious), sociological (including 
demographic), economic, and geographic factors of a foreign country or 
specific global region.28 
This definition was introduced in DODI 5160.70 to serve as a guideline when talking 
about assigning Regional Proficiency skill levels (RP).  The DoD plan is to rate regional 
proficiency on a scale of 0 to 5 (see Table 1).  The University of Maryland Center for 
Advanced Study of Languages (CASL) is currently developing the Regional Proficiency 
Assessment Tool (RPAT) to measure and assign these skill levels.29  The RPAT will be 
discussed later in this thesis; here it is worth highlighting that this refers to knowledge 
about a specific region.  This is relevant because while studying how to increase language 
and cultural expertise within the organization, DoD concluded that there are three 
interconnected components associated with understanding or working with foreign social 
groups: language, culture (general knowledge about culture), and region (knowledge of a 
specific area).   
                                                 
27 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, 7. 
28 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction 5160.70 (12 June 2007), 18. 
29 George Reinhart, “Assessing Regional Proficiency,” (CASL Research Fact Sheet, University of 
Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language, 4 February 2011), accessed 10 September 2011, 
http://www.casl.umd.edu/sites/default/files/TTO81234FS.pdf. 
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Table 1.   Regional Proficiency Skill Level Definitions 
REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVEL 0+ (PRE-NOVICE) 
Aware of very basic facts about the country, region, or culture: location, size, neighboring countries, what 
language is primary, some facts about the government, major personalities, religion(s), some recent history. 
Knows some facts about the relationship between the region and the United States. Knows major social 
norms (e.g., “do’s and don’ts”). May have received familiarization training about the area. Total exposure 
to learning about the country, region, or culture is likely to have been brief, possibly immediately prior to 
assignment or arrival to the region. May have briefly visited the country or region, or have known someone 
from the culture. Needs assistance in understanding or dealing with nearly every situation involving the 
country or culture. May have basic communication skills such as a few common greetings in the primary 
language of the region and some other words or phrases such as: “How much?” or “Where is?” Will have 
difficulty understanding responses in the language if not accompanied by gestures and drawings. 
REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVEL 1 (NOVICE) 
Limited exposure to the country, region, or area of specialization. Less than 1 year of experience. 
Knowledge comes from a combination of education/military experience, area studies, in-country 
assignments, travel, and specialized professional experience. Shows beginning ability to research and write 
summaries of events but has limited ability to explain why the events are significant. Has some level of 
proficiency related to a job that has relevance to a country, region, or issue, but has very limited knowledge 
about the country, region, or issue (e.g., an F-16 mechanic who goes to Norway to work with Norwegian F-
16 mechanics but knows very little about Norway). Has a basic survival-level understanding of the 
culture(s) and may have equally basic communication skills in the predominant language(s). 
REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVEL 2 (ASSOCIATE) 
Has 1 to 2 years of experience working in an area of specialization or focused on a country or region at 
least 50 percent of the time. Has a basic understanding of the region or country. May possess in-depth 
knowledge that is narrowly defined within a region. Unlikely to understand how specialized knowledge fits 
with larger regional issues (i.e., knows military threat, but does not understand economic and political 
infrastructure and implications). Can identify important events, but cannot explain why the event occurred 
or what might happen because of the event. Writes summaries and may present focused briefings on a 
narrow area of specialization. Knowledge comes from a combination of education, military experience, 
area studies courses, in-country assignments, travel, and other educational or professional experience. Has a 
limited understanding of culture(s). May have elementary communication skills including basic 
conversation ability in a language spoken in the country or region. 
REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVEL 3 (PROFESSIONAL) 
Typically, 2 to 4 years of experience working in an area of specialization or focused on a country or region 
at least 75 percent of the time. Viewed as a knowledgeable and valuable resource for issues and trends 
particular to a region or area of specialization. Demonstrates in-depth understanding of a specific subject 
area and directly related factors that affect or influence that area. Has enough knowledge of the area to 
make judgments about it and back them up with arguments. Writes and presents overviews or focused 
briefings based on area of specialization. Knowledge comes from a combination of education, military 
experience, area studies courses, in-country assignments, travel, mentoring, and specialized professional 
experience. Cultural experience reflects the knowledge of someone who has lived in a region or country for 
1 year or more; has been immersed in the culture. Likely to have ILR level 2+ to level 3 proficiency in at 
least one language spoken in the country or region. 
REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVEL 4 (SENIOR PROFESSIONAL) 
Typically, 4 to 7 years in a specialized area, in addition to general experience in a broader subject area. Has 
a deeper knowledge and understanding of most of the components of a region or country than many or even 
most natives of the country. Can create and defend novel viewpoints regarding the subject matter; knows 
the pros and cons of these viewpoints. Consistently identifies deficiencies that affect knowledge of the 
subject area; designs, advises, or implements appropriate solutions. Has experience initiating the 
development or drafting of requirements-related documents and takes the lead in responding to 
requirements levied by others. Has experience developing or drafting policy-related documents or 
providing major input to such documents. Has experience working directly with senior U.S. military 
officers or directly with senior U.S. country or regional policy officers on programs that significantly affect 
U.S. policy in a country or region. Routinely writes and delivers substantive briefings on aspects of the 
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region or country. Knowledge comes from a combination of advanced graduate education, seminars, 
research, teaching, publishing, area studies courses, in-country assignments, travel, mentoring, and 
specialized professional experience. Cultural knowledge and experience allows the individual to blend 
easily in the culture. Almost always has ILR level 3 or higher proficiency in at least one of the languages 
spoken in the country or region. 
REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVEL 5 (EXPERT) 
Has an in-depth, broad understanding of all aspects of the subject area with typically more than 7 years of 
specialized experience. Demonstrates deep understanding of issues and trends particular to an area of 
specialization. Anticipates problems or issues and develops solutions. Knows more than most educated 
people about the country or region and has a specialized knowledge of regional or country topics. Can 
discuss the political structure of the country in the context of abstract political theories, and can apply these 
theories to explain or assess behavior, or knows things about the structure most educated natives of the 
country would not know. Routinely writes and delivers authoritative papers and briefings to high-level 
officials on substantive and detailed subject areas. May have experience as a team leader or major 
contributor to a National Intelligence Estimate or a Theater Security Cooperation Plan related to a region or 
country. May have experience leading a national-level country team or serving as the DoD senior member 
of a national-level country team developing policy related to a country or region. Knowledge comes from a 
combination of advanced post-graduate education, advanced research, teaching, publishing, seminars, in-
country assignments, travel, and specialized professional experience. Has the cultural knowledge of 
someone who is treated like a native by natives of the country; is considered very close to being their equal. 
Only a few, obscure, infrequent, or out-of-the way practices would be unknown. Would probably function 
as a member of the educated elite of that country or region. Almost always has ILR level 4 or higher 
proficiency in at least one of the languages spoken in the country or region.30 
 
These three components are reflected in the title of the DoD’s new strategy for 
developing cultural capability, Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Language 
Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities.31  The Strategic Plan does not use a 
broad, overarching term and instead lists the three components separately throughout the 
document.  In other documents, however, the term cultural capability does refer to all 
three components.  Cultural capability is defined as: 
The ability to apply culture-general knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
attitudes (KSAAs) and culture-specific knowledge to achieve mission 
success in culturally complex environments.32 
Next, we come to the components that comprise cultural capability.  While the 
term “language skills” should be self-evident.  Regional expertise is: 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction Number 5160.70, 18–19. 
31 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense Strategic Plan for 
Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (2011). 
32 Defense Language Office (DLO), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (25 
August 2011), 31.  
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Graduate-level education or 40 semester hours of study focusing on but 
not limited to the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and 
geographic factors of a foreign country or specific global region through 
an accredited educational institution or equivalent regional expertise 
gained through documented previous experience as determined by the 
[Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness)] 
OUSD (P&R) or the Secretary of the Military Department concerned.33   
Regional expertise could be considered the region component of the cultural capability, 
but setting the bar for regional knowledge to have to be acquired through a graduate-level 
education is more suitable for FAOs.  Regional competence seems more appropriate.  
The Army defines this as: 
A set of knowledge, skills, and attributes related to a particular country, 
region, organization, or social group, which enables effective interaction 
with and/or adaptation to that specific culture.34 
This thesis will use regional competence to address the region component of 
cultural capability, recognizing that regional knowledge can come in varying degrees of 
depth and from different venues.   
The best term for capturing the culture-general component of cultural capability is 
cross-cultural competence or 3C.  3C is defined as: 
Competency based on a set of knowledge, skills, abilities and attitudes 
(KSAAs) developed through education, training, and experience that 
provide the ability to operate effectively in culturally complex 
environments. An individual’s 3C can be further developed and 
augmented by the acquisition of cultural, linguistic, and regional 
proficiency, and by their application in cross-cultural environments.35 
As Dr. Allison Greene, Associate Director for Culture in the Defense Language 
Office, puts it, 3C “has at its foundation a culture-general concept that provides the 
framework to learn about and adapt to any culture.”36  In this manner, 3C concerns itself 
                                                 
33 DLO, Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities, 31. 
34 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, 31. 
35 DLO, Implementation Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities, 31. 
36 Allison Greene, “Culture, 3C & Diversity in the DOD” (Briefing to the MLDC, 26 May 2010). 
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with teaching the concepts of culture as a theory.  This is a very useful skill for the 
military, especially for the general purpose force (GPF), since it is an exportable skill not 
tied to a specific region.37  Special Forces also make great use of this skill.  In the survey 
for this thesis, a Special Forces Soldier provided this statement in support of 3C: 
Even though with this war we have very little time to increase our 
knowledge of our specific AOR my experience has shown me that no one 
does what we do better. I am currently deployed to Afghanistan and while 
other branches are trying to "be Green Berets" they are not. I have yet to 
see anybody else work with a host nation counterpart the way we do. So I 
don't think it’s so much about how knowledgeable we are about our AOR 
but how willing we are to work with and learn about our host nation while 
we are in their country.38 
While 3C is useful, competences across the components are not mutually 
exclusive.  The relationship between language, culture, and region is shown in Figure 1.  
Optimum performance can be found where all three circles intersect.39   
 
 
Figure 1.   Components of Cultural Capability40 
                                                 
37 United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Building Cultural 
Capability for Full-Spectrum Operations (Arlington, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 
and Social Sciences, February 2008), 11. 
38 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 5 November 2011. 
39 Regional proficiency should be put into the context of cultural capability.  A review of the 
definitions of the RP’s reveals that regional competence plays a dominating role in regional proficiency.  
Language and culture, however, also play important roles in regional proficiency, especially at higher skill 
levels.  For this thesis, regional proficiency will be thought of as a circle overlapping the region circle.  RP 
1 and below would exist solely in the region circle, while the higher skill levels would reside in the 
intersections of the other circles. 
40 From Greene, “Culture, 3C & Diversity in the DOD.” 
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Given 3C’s utility, there is a growing school of thought within DoD that more 
emphasis should be placed on 3C and less on language and region specific knowledge.41  
The Services tend to favor developing 3C over language or regional knowledge because 
it is seen as a more cost-effective skill.42  Significant research on 3C has been conducted 
by the United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and 
several reports have been produced about how to impart 3C throughout the Army.43  
With a solid 3C foundation, a Soldier can be expected to effectively apply his KSAA 
regardless of the country.  This makes sense for the GPF.  Regional competence and 
language acquisition take time and resources to develop and, as a result, fewer people 
should focus on these skills.  This relationship is best described by Maxi McFarland in 
his article, “Military Cultural Education.”  McFarland writes, “Cultural expertise takes 
time. Cultural literacy and competency skills will enable us to cope with most any 
circumstance of cultural difference. Areas of specific expertise deepen those skills and 
provide context to their application, but programs designed to achieve expertise in a 
given region or culture must begin early and be continuous.”44   
                                                 
41 John Kruse et al., Building Language Skills and Cultural Competencies in the Military: DOD’s 
Challenge in Today’s Educational Environment (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2008), 24. 
42 Jeff Watson, “Language and Culture Training: Separate Paths?” Military Review (March–April 
2010), 93. 
43 As an example, see United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 
Building Cultural Capability for Full-Spectrum Operations (Arlington, VA U.S. Army Research Institute 
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February 2008). 
44 Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” Military Review (March–April 2005), 67. 
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Figure 2.   Regional Specialist Components of Cultural Capability45 
Specialists, such as FAOs, Regional Area Officers (RAO), and intelligence 
analysts need regional education since they can be assigned to specific regions and are 
expected to be experts on that area (see Figure 2).46  Special Forces, with their assigned 
AORs, falls within this same category.47  It should be remembered that Gary Schroen and 
T.E. Lawrence, for example, were not strategically valuable because they only had good 
people skills.  They were also experts in their regions.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses process tracing and cross sectional comparison methods to 
analyze the current state of regional proficiency within the Special Forces Regiment.  It 
identifies skill gaps between the current level of regional proficiency and the required 
level of regional proficiency.   
Process tracing will describe the “chain of events” contributing to the current state 
of regional proficiency within Special Forces.  The current professional education system 
for Special Forces NCOs will be examined to determine how much time is devoted to 
                                                 
45 From Greene, “Culture, 3C & Diversity in the DOD.” 
46 Greene, “Culture, 3C & Diversity in the DOD.” 
47 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3–6. 
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regional proficiency within the training system.  This study also uses a large-N cross 
sectional comparison based on a survey designed to gauge the state of Special Forces’ 
regional proficiency and elicit insights about how better to apply improvements.  In 2009 
and 2010, USSOCOM’s Special Operations Forces Language Office (SOFLO) 
commissioned a SOF Language Training Analysis Support Project.  That project 
surveyed all USSOCOM components and also provided insight.  
This thesis analyzes opportunities for improving regional proficiency.  A review 
of existing and feasible programs, both civilian and military, was conducted.  Using the 
insight provided by the cross-sectional analysis and survey, this thesis concludes with 
recommendations for improving regional proficiency.  
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II. REGIONAL PROFICIENCY.  SO WHAT? 
The complexity of the present strategic environment requires that 
SOF operators maintain not only the highest level of warfighting expertise 
but also regional knowledge and diplomacy skills.48 
—Admiral Eric Olson, SOCOM Strategy 2010 
 
A. REGIONAL PROFICIENCY IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
The future of the U.S. military involves Irregular Warfare (IW).  As stated in 
Department of Defense Directive 3000.7, “IW is as strategically important as traditional 
warfare” and requires the improvement of Department of Defense proficiency in IW.49  
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 
and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other 
capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”50  This definition 
highlights the importance of being able to influence targeted populations and employ 
indirect approaches.  
This need for regional proficiency is further captured in the Irregular Warfare 
Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0 with the statement, “The joint force must develop a 
thorough appreciation of the specific socio-cultural, political, religious, economic, and 
military factors involved and a detailed portrait of key segments of the population, 
including those who wield most influence in the society.”51  The IW JOC, v.2.0 also 
suggests that the majority of IW operations will be “very small-scale and non-combat in 
nature, but longer-term assignments, deployments, and/or repeat tours will be required for 
                                                 
48 Eric Olson, SOCOM Strategy 2010, 1 November 2009. 
49 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, 2.  
50 Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, 31 December 2010, 189. 
51 Department of Defense, IW JOC, ver. 2.0, 25, emphasis added. 
 20 
maximum effectiveness to sustain relationships and develop the in-depth cultural 
knowledge required for effective IW activities.”52  To effectively conduct these 
operations, the IW JOC, v.2.0 stresses the importance of advisory personnel being 
proficient with both language and cultural skills.53  The IW JOC, v.2.0 recommends a 
tiered approach to specialization in skills that “provide an appreciation of the 
environment, as well as linguistic, social, and societal aspects of specified regions.”54  
Again, all such statements make the need for regional proficiency clear.  With regional 
proficiency, the military force can identify and exploit networks within the local social 
structure, which enables effective operations in an irregular warfare struggle.55   
Cultural capabilities are especially critical because influencing the population is 
paramount in IW.56  This need to focus on the population is found in the written 
testimony of the new USSOCOM commander, Admiral William McRaven: “USSOCOM 
must move from a primarily threat-focused approach to a populace-centric approach. To 
achieve U.S. strategic objectives, the instruments of national power, including the 
military, and more specifically SOF, must posture for and then execute an approach 
based on populace-centric engagement.” 57 Within a human network there tend to be key 
personalities or nodes. 58  By identifying these key individuals and influencing them, one 
should be able to affect the entire network, which helps accomplish the goal of 
influencing the population.  As Admiral Olson, the former USSOCOM commander, put it 
in the 2011 SOCOM posture statement, “SOF rarely dominate an area with their mass, so 
they must work with indigenous forces and the local civilian population to accomplish 
their missions.”59 
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To work with indigenous forces and the local civilian population, the military 
must be able to identify the local networks.  For analyzing both licit and illicit networks, 
local knowledge, or regional proficiency, is critical.  According to Barak Salmoni and 
Paula Homes-Eber in Operational Culture for the Warfighter, “understanding the roles, 
positions, and status of various groups and key individuals” allows the warfighter to 
“determine which group(s) are in power” and to “also locate those individuals and groups 
who are in a position to influence power holders.” 60  Identifying key players and 
knowing how to influence them allows the military to affect many by only targeting a 
few.  This ability is critical in irregular warfare.  Identifying these key individuals, 
however, requires an appreciation of the manner in which the local culture group 
organizes relationships.  
In his article, “The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s 
Perspective on Information Operations,” COL Ralph O. Baker highlights the importance 
of targeting key individuals of the population.  Given only 12 months, COL Baker had to 
focus his influence efforts on target audiences.  To do this, COL Baker studied his area of 
operation (AO) in Baghdad in an attempt to learn the local social structure.61  He 
identified and engaged respected community members and sought to create conditions for 
them to serve as his interlocutors to the rest of the population.62  Through an 
understanding of the local social structure, COL Baker hoped to influence the majority of 
the population by engaging only a few key individuals.  In this manner, COL Baker 
sought to use the existing networks to his benefit. 
Another example of the importance of understanding the local social structure can 
be found in the hunt for Saddam Hussein.  The initial efforts proved fruitless because 
coalition forces attempted to track Saddam’s location by targeting people who were high 
ranking within Saddam’s former government.  These high value individuals (HVI) 
proved to be dead ends because with the collapse of the government, Saddam separated 
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himself from his government officials and instead relied upon tribal and familial 
loyalties.63  Through study and an appreciation of the Iraqi tribal structure and the 
relationships between families, analysts were able to uncover the networks that 
eventually led coalition forces to Saddam.64  This example highlights some of the 
problems a military confronts when it lacks regional proficiency.  
Without regional proficiency, a military force is inefficient in irregular warfare 
operations because it might never be aware of networks in its AO.  As Anna Simons and 
David Tucker have written:  
Clans, tribes, secret societies, the hawala system, religious brotherhoods, 
all represent indigenous or latent forms of social organization available to 
our adversaries throughout the non-Western, and increasingly the Western, 
world. These create networks that are invisible to us unless we are 
specifically looking for them; they come in forms with which we are not 
culturally familiar; and they are impossible to ‘see’ or monitor, let alone 
map, without consistent attention and the right training.65   
An ignorant, foreign military force often fails to understand the problems it is addressing 
and is more prone to make mistakes in its dealings with the population and the enemy.  
An example can be found in Terry Tucker’s description of the struggle to control an 
Afghan village in his article, “Language, Culture, and Doctrinal Convergence of Trends 
in Full Spectrum Operations.”  Tucker describes how there are typically three 
components to daily life (political/administrative, religious, and security) in an Afghan 
village with three separate elements responsible for each (the Malik, the Imam, and men 
of the village, respectively).  US forces unfamiliar with how Afghan culture typically 
works seek out and deal only with the Malik.  This proves to be both an inefficient and 
insufficient approach, since the Taliban, their competitors for population control, are 
more culturally attuned and better able to more effectively influence (or coerce) the 
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targeted populations.  In addition to not being able to properly identify the social 
networks within a group, U.S. forces who lack regional proficiency also expose their 
fellow warfighters to several common mistakes.   
The first common mistake made by a foreign force is mirror imaging.  This 
danger is highlighted in Joint Publication 5-00.1: Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning: 
“planners may fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values, 
and reactions that ‘mirror image’ U.S. actions in the same situation, or by assuming that 
the adversary will respond or act in a particular manner.”66  This is a common trap that 
military leaders and analysts often succumb to if not armed with regional knowledge.   
One example is the U.S. military’s initial efforts to map out the network al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI).  General Stanley McChrystal described this mirror imaging in his article, 
“It Takes A Network:”  “Like all too many military forces in history, we initially saw our 
enemy as we viewed ourselves... By habit, we started mapping the organization in a 
traditional military structure, with tiers and rows… But the closer we looked, the more 
the model didn’t hold.”67   Analysts eventually learned that AQI was not a military 
hierarchical structure, but was instead a network of nodes connected via relationships and 
acquaintances.  This required gaining an appreciation for local conditions.   
Another example of mirror imaging can be found in the US military’s approach to 
aid projects.  US forces often assume that the targeted population will want the project 
because the project is desirable from a U.S. perspective.68   This is frequently not the 
case.  Michael Flynn et al describe in their article, “Fixing Intel,” how the women of an 
Afghan village destroyed a well built by a non-government organization (NGO) because 
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it deprived them of a valued long walk to a river.69  In “Avoiding the Cookie Cutter 
Approach to Culture,” Christopher Varhola and Laura Varhola write based on their 
experience in East Africa that, “The United States cannot gain the acceptance of a popu-
lation simply by spending money on social projects.”70  Rather, understanding local 
conditions is critical to determining what the targeted network values.  In the absence of 
this knowledge, the warfighter will most likely project his own values onto the target to 
the detriment of the mission. 
 Beyond mirror imaging, another danger is generalization.  Generalizing occurs 
when the warfighter simplifies the situation by “essentializing” individuals or a specific 
area, which means boiling everyone down to a single type.71  By doing this, the 
warfighter will “fail to grasp the important interconnections between individuals and 
groups—information that could be critical in understanding insurgent networks, the 
movement of illegal goods, or ties of power and alliance in a region.”72  Often military 
personnel view local social structures through strictly a tribal lens.  As Varhola and 
Varhola explain, “This analysis is tempting in its simplicity, but it is wrongheaded. The 
variable role of tribal identity is certainly important within the shifting mix of other 
factors… however, none of these factors can be examined in isolation from the other 
factors or under conditions that stress one factor over others.”73  Their experience in East 
Africa taught them that appearances are often deceiving.  While a social group may 
appear to be acting for one reason, closer inspection reveals other factors influencing 
their behavior.74   
Unfortunately, regional proficiency presents a significant challenge to the US 
military.  Regional proficiency is knowledge about specific areas and the U.S. military is 
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a global force with a high operational tempo.  The U.S. military requires specialists in 
numerous and varied regions and demands can change rapidly. The Department of 
Defense is still struggling to capture an accurate demand signal (i.e., statement of 
requirements) within its bureaucratic system to reflect this need and capability.75  The RP 
system will help meet both of these requirements.76  For now, it is not uncommon to find 
“specialists” within DoD that have little actual expertise in their specific region.77  
Finally and most significantly, creating regional proficiency requires time and an 
investment in education and experience to develop.78   As a result of all of these 
challenges, the DoD is still struggling to develop regional proficiency within the military 
despite acknowledging that it is critical in irregular warfare.   
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Department of Defense’s Acknowledged Need 
As mentioned previously, the requirement for cultural capability, and regional 
proficiency here specifically, is widely recognized throughout the Department of Defense 
(DoD) (see Figure 3).  In 2005, the DoD published the Defense Language 
Transformation Roadmap (DLTR).  This Roadmap was DoD’s initial attempt to assess 
and improve cultural capability within DoD.  Except for the few linguist specific items, 
much of the roadmap is concerned with improving cultural capability across the entire 
DOD through mass production processes. While not specifically addressing the 
requirements of Special Forces NCOs, this document provides the guiding principles for 
improving regional proficiency throughout the Services until 2011.79     
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Figure 3.   Selected DoD, Army, and Marine Corps Documents that  
Addressed the Need for Improved Language and Culture80 
A related document is the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 
(CJCSI) Language and Regional Expertise Planning.  The goal of this document is to 
provide the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) with a common understanding.  
The document defines regional proficiency as “[a]n untapped pool of officers, enlisted, 
and civilian personnel [which] exists that can provide some regional expertise based on 
their experiences with military operations.”81  A Department of Defense Instruction 
(DODI 5160.70) followed in 2007 that published regional proficiency skill level 
guidelines.82  A subsequent Department of Defense Directive, DODD 3000.07, tasked the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to “[e]stablish policies to enable 
DoD-wide tracking of military and civilian personnel with skills and experience relevant 
to IW, including foreign language, regional expertise, and experience or expertise in 
training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces and institutions.”83 
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Following up on the DLTR in 2008, the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, held a hearing 
entitled “Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and 
Regional Expertise Capabilities,” which concerned itself with improving cultural 
capability in DoD and the Services as a whole.  Each Service testified about the programs 
that it had or would implement to improve cultural capability.  Again, many of these 
programs were generic machine processes designed to improve every Soldier, Sailor, 
Airman and Marine.  While some specialists, such as Foreign Area Officers (FAO), 
cryptographers and linguists, were singled out in the testimonies, Special Forces’ 
requirements and needs were barely addressed.84   
One product from this hearing was the report, Building Language Skills and 
Cultural Competencies in the Military.  One of its recommendations was the concept of 
tracking and managing “personnel who, while not language professionals, have validated 
language training/skills or regional expertise.”85  Additionally, this report differentiates 
between regional expertise and cultural awareness.  The report also mentions SOF as 
being “another element [besides FAOs] that traditionally [possesses] regional 
expertise.”86 
Another product from this hearing was the Government Accountability Office’s 
(GAO) report, “DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and Requirements 
Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional Proficiency.”  The GAO 
recommended that DoD “(1) develop a comprehensive strategic plan for its language and 
regional proficiency transformation, (2) establish a mechanism to assess the regional 
proficiency skills of its military and civilian personnel, and (3) develop a methodology to 
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identify its language and regional proficiency requirements.”87 Because DoD is a large 
organization, the GAO identified the need for DoD to capture its cultural requirements 
and its cultural capabilities in a reportable manner.  As discussed previously, defining 
cultural terms is difficult.  Quantifying cultural attributes is even more difficult.  This is 
the task of the RP project.  While some culture professionals may object to distilling 
cultural capability to a number, this system, while imperfect, is necessary for the DoD’s 
bureaucracy to work.  With the RPAT, DoD will be able to relate reportable numbers to 
both unit requirements and unit on-hand capabilities.  More importantly, the RPAT will 
allow the DoD to track regional experts and employ them more gainfully.   
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives, convened again on 29 June 2010 to readdress the 
culture capability issue and to receive a progress report from DoD.  The Senior Language 
Authority, Dr. Nancy Weaver, testified that DoD was in the process of drafting the 
Strategic Plan.88  In accordance with the GAO’s previous recommendation, DoD was 
developing methodologies both to assess regional skill requirements and to define and 
establish criteria to identify regional expertise.  This would become the CASL RPAT 
project.  The RPAT proved to be more complicated than previously anticipated and is 
currently still incomplete.  According to the GAO report filed in conjunction with the 
hearing, “Military Training: Continued Actions Needed to Guide DoD’s Efforts to 
Improve Language Skills and Regional Proficiency,” the expected completion of the 
RPAT would be September 2011.89  As of December 2011, the RPAT is now expected 
sometime in 2012.90  The GAO researchers also noted that there are multiple terms being 
used across DoD.  To simplify things, the GAO settled on the term “regional 
proficiency,” which refers to “acquiring knowledge and skills to familiarize U.S. forces 
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with customs, traditions, and political, social, and economic conditions and other aspects 
of foreign countries and regions… including cultural awareness.”91  Already, however, 
this use of “regional proficiency” is no longer valid, since “cultural awareness” (i.e., 3C) 
is considered a separate component. 
In February 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
signed the Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Language Skill, Regional Expertise, 
and Cultural Capabilities.  The Strategic Plan attempts to coherently address the 
problem of cultural competence in the DoD and establishes the “key priorities for 
addressing language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities.”92  Significant to 
this thesis is the Strategic Plan’s Goal Two.  One objective under Goal Two is to address 
the inefficiencies in the DOD’s personnel processes that “currently hinder the 
development of language, regional, and cultural capabilities.”93 Another objective is to 
“build and improve training and education programs” that create cultural competence.94  
Currently, a supporting document, the Implementation Plan for Language Skills, 
Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities, is being created to operationalize these 
objectives.  This implementation presents end states, performance measures and 
initiatives for each objective found in The Strategic Plan.  Several initiatives relevant to 
this thesis involve modifying personnel policies to increase career flexibility, revamp 
incentive structures, and develop “assignment, training, and development programs” to 
improve cultural competence.95  Since these are strategic documents, the guidance 
provided is broad, but all of these objectives and initiatives reinforce the premise and 
recommendations of this thesis.    
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In the 2010 SOCOM Posture Statement, ADM Olson writes, “To prepare USSOF 
for the challenges ahead, we’re prioritizing career development toward areas best suited 
for irregular environments with emphasis on specialized versus generalized operator 
performance.”96  He goes on, “The unique nature of special operations enables us to 
focus people on specific regions more so than other forces can... with specific emphasis 
on sub-regional and micro-regional knowledge.”97  This concern for regional proficiency 
has continued with Admiral William McRaven’s assumption of command of USSOCOM 
in 2011.  While talking about countering violent extremism, Admiral McRaven reiterated 
this requirement, “In order to do this effectively, any force, whether SOF or GPF, needs 
to have an understanding of the culture, and be able to build relationships with the 
population that promote mutual respect.  A key element in the training of SOF personnel 
is the development of regional and cultural orientation, language capability, and an ability 
to interact effectively in other cultures.”98  These statements echo DoD’s growing 
concern about regional proficiency and highlights USSOCOM’s unique ability to address 
this concern.   
Reviewing these documents makes it clear that DoD does not believe it possesses 
sufficient regionally proficient Soldier, Sailors, Airmen and Marines and it is taking steps 
to address this shortcoming.   
2. Service Initiative 
While DoD was developing the Strategic Plan, the Services developed their own 
plans and are at different stages of implementation.  As a result, each program is slightly 
different.  Depending on the Service, emphasis is placed on different aspects of cultural 
capability and different tools or venues are exploited.  Despite these differences, all of the 
Services’ approaches are focused on developing the whole force primarily through 
professional military education (PME) and pre-deployment training venues.   
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Consequently, recognizing its importance in irregular warfare, the Army has taken 
several steps to improve cultural capability within the general purpose force (GPF).  
Creating cultural capability has become one of the major objectives of pre-deployment 
training for Army units.  Since July 2010, four to six hours of language and cultural 
training has become a mandatory part of pre-deployment training for units destined for 
Afghanistan and Iraq.99  Additionally, one leader in the platoon who will regularly 
engage with the population will receive sixteen weeks of language training at a language 
training detachment.100  To promote cultural capability within the GPF, the Army is 
developing a plan to regionally align brigades.101  Similar to the concept found in Special 
Forces Groups, this would enable brigades to focus on a particular region and to develop 
the necessary cultural capability.   
The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) separates cultural 
skills from foreign language skills.  The ACFLS emphasizes the development of 3C.102  
Under the ACFLS, regional competence falls under cultural competence and would 
primarily be acquired during pre-deployment training and while deployed.103  In contrast, 
AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development, uses the same Venn diagram of 
language, region and culture described in the first chapter of this thesis.  It deviates 
deviates from DoD’s regional proficiency skill levels and develops its own, which it titles 
cultural awareness, cultural understanding, and cultural expertise.104  According to AR 
350-1, culture training will occur in blocks during PME and will be coordinated and 
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developed by the TRADOC Culture Center.105  It recognizes the importance of self-
development and identifies the need to adjust the Army’s reliance on institutional and 
operational training methods.106  Descriptors are provided for these skill levels, but they 
are admittedly general and a follow-on task of determining attainment of these objectives 
is noted.107  Finally, this strategy describes the Special Forces Soldier (like the FAO) as 
both a cultural professional, “an individual with a highly advanced level of knowledge, 
skills, and attributes that pertain to the culture of a particular country or region of the 
world” and a foreign language professional.108   
The Air Force has not only published its strategic plan, Air Force Culture, Region 
& Language Flight Plan, but has also implemented some of its elements.  The Flight 
Plan similarly relies heavily on self-study and PME to create cultural competence.109  To 
assist in this, the Air Force created an Air Force Culture, Region and Language Program 
that consists of modular classes that are available online at the Air Force Culture and 
Language Center Homepage.110   
The Navy’s approach to improving cultural capability produced several 
significant programs that are relevant to this thesis.  The U.S. Navy Language Skills, 
Regional Expertise and Cultural Awareness (LREC)  Strategy outlined the intent to fully 
fund the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Regional Security Education Program 
(RSEP).111  RSEP is designed to provide specialized regional/cultural education to the 
Navy through training teams and distant learning.  Led by a naval officer, the RSEP team 
typically consists of a handful of contracted civilian subject matter experts.  RSEP’s 
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target audience is typically the command team of a naval force.112  RSEP teams provide 
instruction in the form of either graduate-level lectures and seminars or regional 
introductions and overviews.113    Another Navy initiative has been to expand officer 
participation in the Regional Security Studies Master’s Degree at NPS. 114  For its part, 
the Navy’s Center for Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (CLREC) was created 
to provide pre-deployment language and cultural training.115  The Navy’s concept of 
tapping into institutions of higher learning (in this case, NPS) for graduate studies for 
select number of personnel as well as to provide tailored education from regional experts 
offer excellent models for how to improve regional proficiency and will be explored in 
greater depth later in this thesis.   
Perhaps the Service with the most advanced regional proficiency program is the 
Marine Corps.  In the nascent Marine Corps Regional, Culture and Language 
Familiarization Program (RCLF), career Marines (officers and NCOs) are assigned a 
micro-region, which they are responsible for studying for the remainder of their careers.  
Modules are available online at the MARINENET website with separate tracks for each 
micro-region.116  This regional assignment is recorded in the USMC personnel system, 
thereby giving a commander visibility over what regions are studied in his unit. A Marine 
will be expected to complete blocks of instruction throughout his/her career.  Depending 
on the level of implementation, this education will be either completed individually or as 
a mandatory part of PME.  Regional affiliation will not influence assignments or manning 
requirements.  Instead, the intent of this program is to create a large pool of those with 
regional knowledge in the Marine Corps.  The blocks of instruction are basic and the 
expectation is that upon completing the RCLF program, a Marine would have an RP 1 or 
RP 2 at best.  By having a large, but shallow, pool, it is hoped that the Marine Corps will 
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have sufficient regional knowledge to be able to quickly adapt to any global contingency.  
As an example, when a Marine Expeditionary Unit is underway for a Middle East 
assignment, but is re-tasked to respond to a humanitarian disaster in Haiti, there will be a 
handful of Marines that have studied Haiti throughout their careers and can then help 
commanders make informed decisions during the initial deployment.117  This program’s 
formalization of regional proficiency across the entire force makes it the most ambitious 
program among the Services. 
3. Literature Review 
While the Services have been developing strategies and programs to address their 
cultural competency shortfalls, several institutions and academics have also addressed the 
problem.  As mentioned earlier, SWCS developed the IRS to help address the cultural 
capability shortfall.  Beyond the IRS, SWCS has made remarkable progress in developing 
education opportunities for Special Forces NCOs.  Admiral McRaven is intent on making 
USSOCOM the most educated force in DoD.118 Last year, SWCS partnered with 
Fayetteville Technical Community College to create an associate’s degree completion 
program for Special Force Qualification Course (SFQC) students.  SWCS also 
approached several colleges to provide pathways for SF NCOs to complete their 
bachelor’s degree (either with or without the FTCC associate’s degree).  The colleges that 
SWCS has approached to date include Norwich University, Southern New Hampshire 
University, and North Carolina State.119  Programs such as the Norwich Strategic Studies 
and Defense Analysis curriculum appear to have been developed with Special Forces 
NCOs in mind.120  Norwich’s and other academic programs could be used to help 
develop a Special Forces NCO’s regional proficiency if these curriculums concentrate 
sufficiently on regional studies.  Ultimately, it is up to the individual SF NCO to pursue 
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his own education. These bachelor degree opportunities are based on tuition assistance.  
The Directorate of Regional Studies and Education (DRSE) at SWCS negotiates with 
civilian universities and colleges to get them to accept the college credits earned at 
SWCS and to lower tuition to meet tuition assistance criteria.  DRSE is in the process 
partnering with more civilian institutions and hopes to add several with strong programs 
in regional studies.  But, again, the choice will remain with the SF NCO as to whether he 
wants to pursue this education.121   
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is another source of education 
for USSOCOM.  JSOU has made improvements with regard to its standing in academe.  
Some JSOU courses are accredited and the university continues to improve ties with 
certain institutes of higher learning.122  JSOU commissioned a study by Booz Allen 
Hamilton which led it to produce a Joint Special Operations University Future Concept.  
The Future Concept concluded that “JSOU should provide single-point access to 
applicable civilian education and programs that are specifically tailored for joint SOF 
requirements.”123   JSOU’s primary focus is education for the joint operational and 
strategic levels, which is a higher level than SFODA Special Forces NCOs.124  Despite 
this, JSOU is tasked with filling educational gaps for USSOCOM that are not filled by 
the Service components.   
Of course, regional education is not exclusively a Special Forces concern.  
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) could also benefit from enhanced 
regional proficiency.  Much like NPS, JSOU could be used to tap into the regional 
expertise found in academe.  In addition to creating standing courses that are accredited 
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by the state of Florida, JSOU has the ability to coordinate with civilian academics to 
create tailored classes to meet the regional proficiency needs of USSOCOM.125   
In his Strategy Research Project, “Know Before You Go: Improving Army 
Officer Sociocultural Knowledge,” LTC James Laughrey breaks from the PME model 
and proposes that the Army should explore leveraging civilian education initiatives to 
produce regional expertise.  Examining both Vietnam-era and current efforts by the Army 
to produce regional experts, Laughrey concludes that the Army too often attempts to 
mass produce regional experts by courses that are too compressed to accomplish their 
stated goals.126  His analysis and conclusions about the Army’s Vietnam-era training and 
education are insightful and applicable to this thesis.  Among them: the education and 
training needed should have included COIN theory, sociocultural education, and training 
specific to the area of operations and language; that this education required a significant 
investment; and programs that were attempted on the cheap to mass produce this 
expertise failed.127  Laughrey’s analysis and conclusions are relevant since a reflection of 
the Army’s Vietnam-era efforts could be seen in some of today’s efforts.  
Anna Simons also comes to many of the same conclusion in “Seeing the Enemy 
(or Not).” Simons argues that regional proficiency is not something that can be quickly 
produced.  Critical of current military professional development models, Simons states 
that regional proficiency is only possible “if people stay put for long periods of time and 
engage in serious, career-long study of the areas of responsibility.”128   
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This idea of long-term commitment to regional proficiency is often repeated 
elsewhere.  True regional proficiency cannot be established by relying upon pre-
deployment training or by capricious interests in the hot zone du jour. Additionally, 
Simons offers a cautionary note when she mentions that not every soldier is inclined to 
work with other cultures, since it requires a mindset capable of perceiving the world 
through a different lens than that used by the average person.129  This is an important 
consideration for designing a regional proficiency program.  Not every Special Forces 
Soldier will have the ability or inclination to pursue this line of study.  We see this in the 
response by one Special Forces Soldier who recently graduated from the Intermediate 
Language and Culture Course (ILC) pilot program in February 2011.  In the remarks 
portion of a survey, he wrote, “One reason I have such dislike for this course is because I 
don’t want to be here. I could be on a team and deploying, getting first hand culture...You 
are trying to teach people who don’t want to be here or don’t care about this stuff and it 
just doesn’t work.”130  The unwillingness or inability of some within Special Forces to 
regionally specialize has to be acknowledged.  This argues for potentially taking a more 
individualized approach.  
The importance of individual capability and the importance of understanding 
specific circumstances in cross-cultural conflicts appear again in another monograph by 
Simons titled, “Got Vision?  Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy: What It Is, and Why 
We Need It.”  While most of the monograph is devoted to the importance of identifying 
military/strategic genius, Simons also introduces the idea of the Lawrence Paradox.  
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conflict is insufficient, since each conflict is unique.131  This concept can be applied to 
the need to understand specific situations.  To properly fight an asymmetric conflict, 
specialized knowledge is required.  While a study of COIN or an understanding of culture 
in general are important bases of knowledge for a Special Forces Soldier, he needs 
detailed knowledge of a specific region to be able to properly leverage his abilities.   
Varman Chhoeung and Chad Machiela’s NPS thesis, “Beyond Lawrence: 
Ethnographic Intelligence for USSOCOM” echoes many of these ideas.  In it they 
propose the creation of an organization of individuals who are ethnographic sensors.  By 
acquiring language, education and regional expertise through long-term exposure to the 
area, these individuals would be able to provide USSOCOM with the required 
ethnographic intelligence.  Ethnographic sensors would be very specialized individuals.  
While “Beyond Lawrence’s” recommendation is the creation of a very small, specialized 
cohort, this thesis seeks to improve the capabilities of most Special Forces NCOs who are 
actively serving within the Special Forces Regiment.132 
While Chhoeung and Machiela advocate select Special Forces Soldiers 
maintaining a permanent presence in foreign countries, Christopher Pratt advocates the 
stationing of all of the Special Forces Groups abroad in their respective areas of 
responsibility (AORs).  In his NPS thesis, “Permanent Presence For the Persistent 
Conflict: An Alternative Look at the Future of Special Forces,” Pratt argues that by being 
stationed within the AOR, Special Forces would be better positioned to develop cultural 
capability and it would improve their understanding of the operational environment.133  
To accomplish this, Pratt proposes distributing the subcomponents throughout the 
AOR.134  As numerous veterans of the forward-deployed battalions (1-10
th
 SFG(A) and 
1-1
st
 SFG(A)) indicated in my survey and interview research for this thesis, the benefits 
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of being stationed in the AOR are substantial, especially with regard to developing 
cultural capability.   To quote one respondent, “The best way to acquire regional 
expertise is to assign a SF [S]oldier to a forward deployed [battalion].  I was assigned to 
1/1 [Okinawa] for three years on the same team and traveled extensively throughout my 
AOR for work and leisure.  I am now [serving] as an Army attaché in Southeast Asia and 
can go toe-to-toe with every Southeast Asia Foreign Area Officer.”135  Maintaining 
forward deployed units in an AOR would certainly increase Special Forces regional 
proficiency.  However, this would also be a costly and significant endeavor for Special 
Forces and determining its feasibility would require much more in-depth research.  
Despite this, Pratt’s argument has merit and it should be further explored.   
Eric Homan’s Strategic Research Project (SRP), “Expanding U.S. Army 
Language and Cultural Proficiency,” weaves together elements of PME and civilian 
education to address the regional proficiency issue.  Homan proposes creating a FAO-lite 
program for all or most officers that would be implemented in conjunction with the 
Captain’s Career Course.136  Even though his analysis is officer- and FAO-centric, his 
recommendations are informative.  They have some applicability to this thesis since they 
deal with developing regional specialization and are based on the FAO training program. 
Another SRP that draws upon the FAO program for inspiration is COL Wade 
Owens’ “Improving Cultural Education of Special Operations Forces.”  COL Owens (a 
Special Forces Officer) analyzes SWCS’ training program and finds it lacking with 
regard to cultural training.  COL Owens points out that, following initial qualification 
training, SOF personnel have “little opportunity, beyond self-study and operational 
deployments…to improve language and cultural expertise.”137  COL Owens proposes a 
FAO-inspired SOF Language and Cultural Education Program.  The program would 
consist of three levels.  The first level is basic language (ILR 1/1) and culture education 
during initial qualification training.  The second level would be advanced training 
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through either Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) or a theoretical USSOCOM institutional 
training program.  This level would impart advanced language (ILR 2/2) and cultural 
training.  The third, and final, level would be in-country immersion, which would take the 
form of attendance at a partner nation military school with follow-on assignment to a 
partner nation military training institution or unit.138     
Hy Rothstein also highlights the need for regional proficiency in Special Forces in 
his book Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare.  Rothstein 
concludes that a UW force for the future would “require education and training beyond 
the current standard.”139  Stressing the importance of regional proficiency for a force 
designed for unconventional warfare (UW), Rothstein argues that the level of regional 
proficiency in Special Forces is insufficient.  Critical of current rotational policies, 
Rothstein writes, “It takes a long time, sometimes years, to cultivate an area and to 
inculcate regional expertise” and Special Forces should not rotate regions every few 
years.140  This idea that UW requires a high degree of regional expertise developed over 
time is a recurring theme in works related to UW.   
The requirement for a high-level of regional proficiency in Special Forces is also 
found in COL Eric Wendt’s article, “The Green Beret Volckmann Program: Maximizing 
the Prevent Strategy.”  COL Wendt describes a preventive strategy against al-Qaeda 
(AQ) that emphasizes cost-effective, proactive measures against the spread of AQ.  The 
basis of these measures is collaboration with targeted countries through persistent 
engagement.  This persistent engagement program would “stress the need for a few Green 
Berets… to be thoroughly steeped in select languages and cultures, and would produce 
Soldiers who are experts in individual countries and select key units (unlike foreign-area 
officers, who are regional experts) in support of a persistent-presence approach.”141  
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Similar to Chhoeung’s and Machiela’s ethnographic sensors, these Special Forces   
Soldiers would be a select, specialized cohort that would have a very high RP, ideal for 
working well with foreign forces.  COL Wendt’s training path for the Volkmann Program 
is a potential model for developing an extremely high level of regional proficiency in 
select Special Forces Soldiers.   
Joint Special Operations University has published numerous reports on educating 
SOF.  The most applicable monograph is “Educating Special Forces Junior Leaders for a 
Complex Security Environment” by Russell Howard.  Howard argues that Special Forces 
captains should begin a graduate program early in their career in order to improve their 
cultural capability.142  Much of Howard’s article echoes this thesis except Howard 
focuses on the graduate education requirement of a Special Forces officer.   
C. REGIONAL PROFICIENCY SKILL LEVELS 
A major challenge for the Department of Defense in tracking and managing 
regional proficiency among its personnel is the actual assessment and documentation of a 
person’s level of expertise.  To do this, the Defense Language Office (DLO) contracted 
the University of Maryland Center for Advanced Study of Language (CASL) to develop 
an algorithm to quantify a person’s experience and abilities and rate a person in 
accordance with the six levels of regional proficiency as prescribed by DODI 5160.70.143  
CASL identified five constructs that contribute to regional proficiency.  These constructs 
are:  
1. Language Proficiency–assessed through self-assessment and/or 
proficiency testing 
2.  Education–academic degrees, with special attention given to advanced 
degrees and degrees in area/culture studies and foreign languages 
3. Training–military based training at all levels for officers, warrant 
officers, and enlisted personnel 
4.  Experience–deployments and overseas experiences (e.g., study abroad) 
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5.  Individual Characteristics–psychometric assessments of tolerance of 
ambiguity and openness to new experiences.144 
To calibrate the algorithm, CASL used a pool of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) to 
determine what constitutes RP 3.  FAOs are considered the military’s subject matter 
experts for regional proficiency.  FAOs with hypothesized levels were measured and 
additional FAOs were tested against this standard to validate the algorithm.  A survey of 
the GPF is currently being conducted. CASL will then use this to determine the 
distinguishing traits of the lower RPs.  The intent is to provide an algorithm that is 
academically sound and produces an accurate rating system.145  In this manner, an RP 
score will have the same utility as an ILR score for commanders.146     
The algorithm could be used in two different approaches: a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach.  The top-down approach is referred to as data mining; with it, the 
algorithm would be applied to a database of personnel records and would be used to 
determine the RP scores of the people in that database.  This would enable commanders 
to sift through their inventory to find the most appropriate/best suited individuals for 
assignments requiring a certain level of regional proficiency.  The RP is not designed to 
be a decision tool.  Instead it is meant to be a filter.  If a mission requires an RP 3 for 
Haiti, the data mining approach could help sort through a division of 1,500 to find the 
twenty soldiers who meet the criteria.  The commander will then be left with a 
manageable number of people from among whom to select.147   
This data mining approach requires a standardized approach in personnel data 
entry, which has posed challenges.  Culture training, language training and experience are 
not currently recorded in a standardized manner.  Not only are there differences between 
Services in the management of personnel records, but there are discrepancies within a 
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single Service as well.  This lack of standardization in capturing cultural training was one 
of the issues identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in a recent 
report.148    The DoD is working to resolve this issue and, ideally, eventually, all relevant 
data tied to the RP will be standardized.  This will allow the data mining to be universally 
applied in much the same way the ILR ranking is currently applied. 
The bottom-up approach, meanwhile, involves the use of the Regional Proficiency 
Assessment Tool (RPAT), which is based on the algorithm, but depends on an individual 
stepping forward to enter his information into the tool to determine his RP.  In this 
manner, an individual self-selects himself to identify his regional proficiency and add it 
to his personnel file.  As a result, the higher level RP candidates would typically be 
motivated to identify their capability.   
D. FOREIGN AREA OFFICER–THE GOLD STANDARD 
Since FAOs are considered to be the subject matter experts for military regional 
proficiency, it is insightful to review FAO training and see if any of their techniques 
could be applied to Special Forces.  As described by Army Regulation 600-3 (AR 600-3): 
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, FAOs are 
“Soldiers who are regionally focused experts in political-military operations with 
advanced language skills, cultural understanding and the ability to advise senior military 
and civilian strategic decision-makers in an era of persistent conflict.”149  Their 
regionally focused unique skills and knowledge include a minimum Interagency 
Language Roundtable (ILR) level 2/2 in a language, “in-depth understanding of foreign 
culture gained from a regionally focused graduate degree and experience living and 
working in a specified region,” and expert knowledge of regional military forces.150  Of 
note, FAO’s are required to have at least a Regional Expertise rating of level 3 
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(professional) as defined by CJCSI 3126.01.151  This is the only time that the Regional 
Expertise (i.e., RP) rating is mentioned in AR 600-3.   
To achieve this standard, the FAO branch developed an initial training program 
broken into five phases.  Three of these phases are focused on creating cultural 
capability: language training, in-country training (ICT), and advanced civil schooling 
(ACS).  Language training is conducted at one of the Defense Language Institutes where 
the FAO candidate must score a minimum of ILR 2/2.  The expectation is that the FAO 
will continue to improve his assigned language during ICT.   
ICT is an immersion program and is designed to give the FAO practical 
experience in his assigned region.152  ICT is traditionally 12 months for Army FAOs, 
although other Services conduct only six month courses.  AR 600-3 describes ICT in the 
following passage:  
ICT is designed to immerse the officer, accompanied by their Family 
where appropriate, in the local language and culture of their assigned 
AOC. This can be accomplished through attendance at a host nation 
professional military education (PME) course or assignment to a host 
nation military unit. It is designed to provide advanced language studies 
and develop in-depth knowledge of the region through a program of travel, 
research, and self-study. The FAOs are expected to conduct extensive 
familiarization travel throughout the region and attain first-hand 
knowledge of national and regional cultures, geography, political-military 
environments, economies, and societal differences.153 
ICT is based on developing six competencies: Regional Experience and Knowledge; US 
Policy Goals and Formulation; Language; Military-to-Military Experience; U.S. Military 
Involvement; and Embassy Administration and Offices.154   
There is no set standard or training plan for ICT.  As explained in the Foreign 
Area Officer (FAO) In-Country Training ICT Handbook, “Each of our ICT sites is 
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different and it would be impossible to thoroughly explain or anticipate every 
scenario.”155   Given this diversity and inability to create an all-encompassing program of 
instruction, a great deal of latitude is given to the FAO for planning his specific ICT.  The 
prospective FAO will be mentored by senior FAOs in their region to maximize the ICT 
experience, but it is largely based on individual initiative.156  Additionally, most FAO 
stations have developed standard operating procedures for their particular country or 
region to provide initial guidance to the FAO.157   
Latitude is again found in the Army’s approach to ACS for FAOs.  While the 
Navy and Air Force restrict most of their FAO trainee options, the Army values diversity 
in its approach to ACS.  Army FAOs have the opportunity to select from a wide range of 
civilian institutions so long as the graduate degree is regionally focused.  The FAO 
Proponent publishes an annual list of approved graduate programs, but FAOs also have 
the opportunity to attend other programs that provide at least 60 percent of their required 
credits in “the appropriate regional focus.”158  Given the latitude in what the FAO 
candidate can study, mentorship is again important in the ACS phase.  FOAs maintain 
contact with their regional managers who review curricula to ensure suitability.159   
Comparing these three phases (language training, ICT, and ACS) to a Special 
Forces NCO’s career, several similarities emerge.  Language is also an important skill in 
Special Forces.  Over a career, most SF NCOs will acquire extensive experience in their 
region and some will experience prolonged deployments in their AOR that could be 
considered immersion training.  While most SF NCOs might not achieve a master’s 
degree, it is reasonable to assume that they will obtain a bachelor’s degree and this degree 
could well be regionally focused.  In addition to these three phases of regional 
proficiency development, it is important to highlight that FAO development relies upon 
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mentorship by veteran FAOs.  Mentorship is also found in Special Forces, but whether 
the mentorship is applied to regional proficiency remains a question.   
 47 
III. SPECIAL FORCES AND REGIONAL PROFICIENCY 
The regionally astute Special Forces Soldiers are educated to develop and 
sustain long-term relationships with indigenous personnel and therefore 
create a cadre of language and culturally astute Soldiers who provide 
TSOC commanders, ambassadors, and follow-on forces with critical 
capabilities and knowledge. 
   —FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations160 
A. SPECIAL FORCES RAISON D’ETRE. 
From my last two tours in Afghanistan, with OEF XV being totally 
offensive in nature (Official Partnership with ANA) to OEF XVII where I 
conducted Village Stability Operations[, c]learly direct action is a skill set 
that should be placed on the low end of the priority. Rapport building, 
interpersonal skills, and UW are the skills that make Green Berets great. 
—Special Forces Soldier161 
The emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) with its inherent requirement for regional 
proficiency marks a significant organizational culture shift within DoD writ large.  
Despite this, some elements within DoD were specifically formed to meet the challenges 
of IW and already place a premium on cultural capability.  Developing regional, cultural, 
and language skills through consistent regional alignment has always been a fundamental 
aspect of a number of elements of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), namely 
Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO).162  The importance placed on cultural competence, and particularly regional 
proficiency, makes ARSOF unique within DoD.  As Major General Bennet Sacolick, 
Commanding General of USAJFKSWCS, stated, ARSOF “are the only [DOD] forces 
specifically trained and educated to work with indigenous forces” and possess a unique 
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set of capabilities to influence targeted populations.163  Within ARSOF, SF again stands 
out in its “combination of abilities to shape, prevent, deter, and influence global strategic 
events through persistent and sophisticated foreign indigenous engagement.”164  This 
ability for “persistent and sophisticated foreign indigenous engagement” is a result of 
Special Forces’ emphasis on regional proficiency.  As IW assumes a more dominant role 
in the global threat paradigm, Special Forces’ regional proficiency will only become 
more valuable. 
Special Forces’ ability in IW is inextricably linked to its founding mission, 
unconventional warfare (UW).  Special Forces is a direct descendant of the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS), whose mission in World War II was to conduct UW.165  
Needing to operate by, with and through indigenous personnel, OSS personnel had 
extensive cultural and language expertise in their targeted area of operations.166  OSS 
veterans emphasized the importance of being fluent in the language and being familiar 
with the culture of the partnered forces in order to effectively execute UW.167  When 
Special Forces was created with the mission of conducting UW, the OSS’s experiences 
played an influential role in forming Special Forces’ doctrine and composition.168  
Special Forces’ early experiences in low-intensity conflict solidified the importance of 
cultural capability.   
In his article, “The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare,” Richard Newton highlights the 
fact that in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Special Forces training included “a healthy dose 
of regional familiarity, local languages, cultural acumen and instructor development” in 
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addition to the combat skills that they employed and taught.169 Newton goes on to say 
that “A Special Forces soldier had to become part anthropologist, part diplomat… and 
part cultural attaché as well as being an excellent soldier and trainer.” 170 
Over the years, other core competencies were added to Special Forces, but UW is 
still considered its fundamental task and heavily influences doctrine.  Several other 
organizations may play a role in a UW campaign, but Special Forces’ role in UW is 
unique.171  According to FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, “Only Special Forces 
are specifically selected, organized, trained, and equipped for UW. No other Department 
of Defense (DoD) force has the same combination of capabilities, characteristics, and 
attributes as Special Forces.”172 This influence of the UW mission, with its requirement 
for cultural capability, can be found throughout the Special Forces organization.   
Cultural capability is considered so important that it is a primary consideration in 
the process of assessment and selection of Special Forces Soldiers.  In her monograph, 
“Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are,” Jessica 
Turnley examines the assessment and selection process.  Of all of the major components 
with a selection process, only Special Forces places a heavy emphasis on assessing its 
recruits for their potential for cultural capability.173  The 6
th
 Special Operations Squadron 
(SOS), a minor component of Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), also 
selects for cultural capability, but its small size discounts it from being placed in the same 
category as the other major components of USSOCOM (i.e., 75
th
 Ranger Regiment,  
 
 
                                                 
169 Richard Newton, “The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare,” in Contemporary Security Challenges: 
Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches,  JSOU Report 09-03 (Hulbert Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 
2009), 3.  
170 Richard Newton, “The Seeds of Surrogate Warfare,” in Contemporary Security Challenges: 
Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches,  JSOU Report 09-03 (Hulbert Field, FL: The JSOU Press, 
2009), 3.  
171 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 1–2. 
172 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 1–2. 
173 Jessica Turnley, “Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way SOF are,” 
JSOU Report 11-1, (MacDill  Air Force Base: JSOU Press, 2011), 40. 
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SEALs, MARSOC, etc.).  The fact that Special Forces requires this potential in a 
candidate is a significant indicator of how important cultural capability is to the 
organization.   
Special Forces doctrine underscores that cultural capability is considered a central 
component in the development of a Special Forces Soldier.174  Within FM 3-05.20, 
Special Forces Operations the term “cultural competency” is used.  This is composed of 
four modalities: Interpersonal Skills, Nonverbal Communication Skills, Language 
Proficiency, and Regional Orientation.175  These are defined in Table 2.  With slight 
modification, they can be converted to fit the heuristic found in Chapter I.  Interpersonal 
skills can be considered the culture component of cultural capability.  Language 
proficiency is the language component.  Regional orientation is the region component.  
Since there are both general and region specific aspects to nonverbal communication 
skills, this modality could be divided between the culture and region components.  In 
addition to what is written in the FM, Special Forces published a training circular, 
Training Circular (TC) 31-73, Special Forces Advisor Guide, which highlights the 
importance of cultural capability in one of Special Forces primary roles, that of a military 
advisor.  TC 31-73 goes into some depth on the necessity of cultural capability and how it 






                                                 
174 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 1–1. 
175 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3-25 – 3-26. 
176 Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 31-73, Special Forces Advisor Guide, 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2011), Chapter 2. 
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Table 2.   Special Forces Cultural Competence Modalities177 
Interpersonal Skills:  Interpersonal skills are critical to Special Forces operations. They require the ability 
to listen with understanding, the ability to maintain an open mind, and the sensitivity to observe and grasp 
the essential components of a given situation. Special Forces Soldiers combine the ability to overcome 
ethnocentricity and to treat indigenous forces as equals, while also communicating and teaching across 
intercultural barriers. Special Forces Soldiers use their interpersonal skills to obtain and maintain 
appropriate relationships with partner nation counterparts. Obviously, interpersonal skills are difficult to 
define and to quantify; however, Special Forces Soldiers possess the ability to interact with indigenous 
personnel through charismatic and personal engagement. 
 
Nonverbal Communication Skills:  Nonverbal communications are wordless messages—the way people 
communicate by sending and receiving signals; for example, body language, eye movements, gestures, 
postures, proximity, facial expressions, and symbols. Similar to verbal communications, nonverbal 
communications differ across cultures although some signals are shared. The impact of a communication 
message can be broken down into 7 percent verbal (words), 38 percent vocal (volume, pitch, rhythm, and 
so on), and 55 percent body movements (mostly facial expressions). Special Forces Soldiers learn to 
communicate nonverbally without acquiring a foreign language through a good understanding of a 
population’s nonverbal communication systems. 
 
Language Proficiency:  Language proficiency is a key component in cross-cultural communications. Each 
prospective Special Forces Soldier is tested for his language ability through either the Defense Language 
Proficiency Test or the Oral Proficiency Interview. The Defense Language Proficiency Test measures 
reading and listening skills and the Oral Proficiency Interview measures participatory and active 
conversation. To graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course, each prospective Special Forces 
Soldier must attend language curriculum and/or pass one of these measurement tests. The desired portrait 
of a Special Forces Soldier is one who can gain and maintain rapport with indigenous personnel; learning a 
language through participatory and active conversation remains a priority over reading and listening. 
Though participatory dialogue remains a priority, it is not wise to discount the fact that a Special Forces 
Soldier may be required to translate documents or listen to intercepted conversations. This education is 
merely a stepping stone as Special Forces Soldiers continue to improve their language skills through 
routine and dedicated unit-sponsored training, immersion training, individual study, and repeated 
deployments to their region of orientation. As a result, all Special Forces Soldiers possess varying levels of 
language ability in one or more foreign languages. 
 
Regional Orientation:  Special Forces units are regionally oriented to ensure they have the resident skills 
and knowledge of the belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits of a specific 
region to allow them to influence their HN counterparts. This understanding of the region extends into the 
political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, and physical environment systems within 
that region and how they apply to military operations. Formal training and cultural immersion during 
repeated deployments are the vehicles for developing this understanding. 
 
 
While cultural capability as a whole looms large for Special Forces, the 
requirement for regional proficiency is especially stressed.  According to DA PAM 600-3, 
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, a part of the 
unique knowledge that SF officers possess is “an in-depth knowledge of at least one 
                                                 
177 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3-25 – 3-26. 
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region of the world and proficiency in at least one of the region’s languages.”178  The 
importance placed on regional proficiency can likewise be found in Special Forces’ 
organizational structure.  The Special Forces Groups are purposefully aligned with 
different regions of the world (see Figure 4).179  Theoretically, each group can divide its 
region into sub-regions, allowing each subordinate command to focus on a progressively 
smaller portion of the AOR.  This regional focus allows Special Forces Groups to 
consistently deploy soldiers to the same regions throughout a career.  Through persistent 
engagement, there is the potential for Special Forces Soldiers to become steeped in 
regional knowledge and provide critical capabilities and knowledge to a TSOC, 
ambassador, or conventional forces.180 
 
Figure 4.   Regional Orientation of the Special Forces Groups181 
                                                 
178 Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, Commissioned 
Officer Professional Development and Career Management, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 
2010), 168. 
179 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3–5. 
180 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3–24. 
181 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 3–6. 
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The reason for this emphasis on regional proficiency is that selected Special 
Forces missions “require a detailed knowledge of the cultural nuances and languages of a 
country or region where employed.”182  For tasks such as COIN, UW, and FID, regional 
proficiency is a critical element for mission success.183  The ARSOF Imperative—
understand the operational environment— encapsulate this:   
Understand the operational environment. Special Forces cannot dominate 
the operational environment without first gaining a clear understanding of 
the joint operations area, including civilian influence, as well as enemy 
and friendly capabilities. Combat environmental research—political, 
economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military—is an 
essential prerequisite to influencing the environment. Special Forces must 
identify the friendly and hostile decisionmakers, their objectives and 
strategies, and the ways they interact.184 
This clearly shows that Special Forces understands the nature of IW and that 
regional proficiency is essential for the successful conduct of IW.  Special Forces has 
understood this longer than most, since they are designed to operate in small teams in 
hostile territory.  For Special Forces their ability to influence and to understand networks 
is critical to survival.  The study of local populations has long been tied to the Special 
Forces mission.   
For developing this regional proficiency, SF doctrine states that it will be 
developed through “formal training and cultural immersion during repeated 
deployments.”185  Tied into this is the guidance from USSOCOM.  For cultural 
education, USSOCOM Manual 350-8, The Special Operations Forces Language 
Program, states that the bulk of the burden of initial training for cultural education should 
be on the training institution. 186  In Special Forces case this is SWCS.  After initial 
                                                 
182 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 1–10. 
183 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2-4, 2-13, and  3-1. 
184 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2011), 1-11. 
185 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2011), 3-26. 
186 United States Special Operations Command, USSOCOM Manual (M) 350-8, The Special 
Operations Forces Language Program (MacDill Air Forces Base: USSOCOM, 2009), 2. 
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training, experience, sustainment training in operational units, and PME will enhance this 
capability.187  To see how Special Forces applies its doctrine, we will now look at how 
regional proficiency is developed across four categories: initial training, sustainment 
training, experience, and PME.  
B. REGIONAL PROFICIENCY DEVELOPMENT 
1. Initial Training 
Despite what has long been said about the importance of regional proficiency in 
and for Special Forces, there are surprisingly few structured programs designed to 
enhance regional proficiency across the Regiment.  The majority of formal instruction 
occurs during initial training, called the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).  Of 
the three components of cultural capability, language instruction dominates (see Figure 
5).  This makes sense given the inherent difficulty of learning a language.  However, 
instruction in the other two components is exceptionally small, especially when compared 
to the overall length of the SFQC.  As of October 2011, there were only 12 hours of 
instructions devoted to region specific education in the SFQC.188  To put that into 
perspective, that equates to 1.5 training days.  The average length for course completion 
is 255-285 training days.  This is not meant to be a critique of the SFQC.  The SFQC is a 
tightly managed affair and is constantly under review for its efficiency.  There, literally, 
is no extra time in the SFQC.  Becoming a Special Forces Soldier requires mastering 
many essential, technical skills which include learning one of the Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOS), common tactical combat skills, and a language.  Clearly, 12 hours can 
only serve as an introduction to a region and does not make anyone an expert on a region; 
Special Forces must thus expect its members to develop regional proficiency elsewhere.   
 
                                                 
187 USSOCOM, USSOCOM M 350-8, 2. 
188 David Walton, Department Chief, Directorate of Regional Studies and Education (DRSE), 
JKFSWCS, correspondence with author, 24 October 2011. 
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Figure 5.   Overview of Special Forces Qualification Course189 
2. Sustainment Training 
For people who are not self-motivated to learn about the AOR on their 
own, providing time with a structured result such as a paper or report may 
be necessary.  Additionally, language, history or culture classes at a 
foreign school would be a huge incentive as most SF guys that I know 
love the immersion aspect.  We just have to ensure that progress is 
measured and captured [to] avoid the boondoggle in a foreign country 
with no real results.  
—Special Forces Soldier190 
 
                                                 
189 From “SWCS Today,” (accessed 24 October 2011), 
http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/SWCS%20Today.pdf 
190 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 8 October 2011. 
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Once in a unit, there are few structured programs for improving cultural 
capability.  As previously mentioned, SWCS developed the Intermediate Regional 
Studies (IRS) in 2011 to help fill this gap.191  IRS attempts to address both the culture 
and regional components of cultural capabilities.192  Students are exposed to 3C elements 
in the first seven days of IRS.  The primary tool for this is the Political, Military, 
Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, and Time 
(PMESII-PT) framework.  PMESII-PT is a systems approach for analyzing an area 
commonly used in the Army and stands for political, military, economic, social, 
information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time.193   Students then apply their 
understanding of culture to their targeted region.  Approximately 50 hours of classroom 
instruction is devoted to this.  The aim is to ensure a graduate has a thorough 
understanding of the PMESII-PT framework and can then apply it to any situation.194  
SWCS currently sends approximately the top 15% of the graduating class to IRS.195  
The only other structured programs normally attended by Special Forces Soldiers 
for improving cultural capability are courses at the language institutes, such as the 
Defense Language Institute and Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey, CA, or 
the Partner Language Training Center Europe (PLTCE) in Garmisch, Germany.196  
However, language courses do not significantly improve regional proficiency.   
As for unit sustainment training, as the name implies this is dependent on the unit.  
Whether we are talking about a Group, battalion, company or SFODA, different units 
approach cultural capability in different ways.  Because approaches are so varied, it is 
difficult to address this aspect in a categorical manner.  Some Groups have developed 
                                                 
191 While IRS is available for all SF Soldiers, the vast majority of students are recent SFQC graduates 
who have not yet been sent to their units.   
192 A separate course, Intermediate Language Course (ILC) is also available for improving a Soldier’s 
language ability.   
193 Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 2010), 1–5. 
194 Lorae Roukema, IRS Instructor, correspondence with the author, 25 October 2011. 
195 “SWCS Today,” (accessed 24 October 2011), 
http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/SWCS%20Today.pdf 
196 JSOU sometimes provides regionally oriented courses and is developing a 3C course. 
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their own in-house training programs.  As an example, the 5
th
 SFG(A) recently developed 
its own six-month language program to allow SFODAs to send members to a language 
school without incurring time away from home.197  For regional proficiency, specifically, 
however, there are a few tools available to encourage regional proficiency within a 
SFODA.  Area assessments are a common task for Special Forces Soldiers and a 
fundamental part of the UW mission. Tied to area assessments are area studies.198  The 
Special Operations De-briefing and Retrieval System (SODARS), is a document created 
after each deployment outside the continental United States (OCONUS) centrally 
managed by the J2, USSOCOM.  These documents are used by Special Forces Soldiers to 
learn about a specific area.  SFODAs who consistently deploy to that region typically 
maintain a detachment-internal folder on that region.  This is normally a living document 
that is constantly updated, experiences captured by the SFODA can be passed on to new 
members of the SFODA.  This can be an effective tool, but whether it is depends on how 
well the unit conducts its assessment, which in turn depends on how seriously the unit 
takes this specific task.  As a result, the quality and use of these documents is haphazard.  
Some units do it well, while others do not.  Furthermore, these documents depend on 
consistent deployment to a specific region.   
                                                 
197 Bissell, Brandon, “USSOCOM votes 5th SFG(A) language program of the year,” press release on 
U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) Facebook page, (accessed 24 October 2011), 
http://www.facebook.com/SFCommand. 
198 Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2010), Appendix A and B. 
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3. Experience and PME 
The final methods for developing regional proficiency are experience and 
PME.199  The first career path that will be examined is the Special Forces NCO.   
As can be seen in Figure 6, an NCO can join a Special Forces SFODA between 
the ranks of SGT and SFC.200  In total, an SF NCO should have at least seven years of 
experience on an SFODA with the potential for much more.201  This is a significant 
amount of time over which an SF NCO might experientially acquire regional proficiency.  
                                                 
199 Here it is necessary to examine separately the three types of Special Forces Soldiers:  NCOs, 
Warrant Officers and Officers since each has a distinctly different developmental model that affects both 
potential experience and PME.  To simplify this analysis and to keep it as objective as possible, the time 
spent on an SFODA will be considered to be the minimum time required at each rank to successfully 
qualify for promotion as dictated by the Army’s governing documents (DA PAM 600-3 and DA PAM 600-
25).  For experience time, this thesis will only consider time spent on an SFODA.  The reasoning is that 
Special Forces Soldiers are most often deployed while on an SFODA.  Additionally, the SFODA-level 
deployment experience is most likely to impart regional experience since it is at the SFODA-level that 
interaction with a foreign population is most likely.  Deployments at other organizational levels could also 
develop regional proficiency, but those experiences are too infrequent and varied to be captured in this 
analysis.  Additionally, Special Forces careers are varied.  It is possible to become a Special Forces NCO at 
various times in one’s military career and it is possible to become a Special Forces Warrant Officer at 
various times in one’s Special Forces NCO career.  Depending on when one becomes a Special Forces 
NCO or Special Forces Warrant Officer can drastically affect the amount of time spent on an SFODA.  
Additionally, some enjoy more time on SFODAs due to a variety of factors that is beyond the scope of this 
research.   
200 Because of acquired time in grade in an MOS prior to joining an SFODA, a SGT or SSG could be 
quickly promoted while on an SFODA.  Because of this, SGT experience will be discounted.  To avoid 
discounting the experience level that most Special Forces NCOs do have on an SFODA, the suggested time 
for a SSG on an SFODA will be considered.  According to DA PAM 600-25, before being eligible for 
selection for promotion, a SSG should successfully serve two years on an SFODA.  The first rank 
commonly held by all Special Forces NCOs is SFC.  The minimum time on an ODA is three years before 
he can be considered eligible for promotion.  The final rank that will be considered for acquired experience 
is MSG, which is the rank of the ODA Team Sergeant, the senior NCO of an ODA.  To be considered 
eligible for promotion, a MSG must successfully serve two years on an ODA. 
201 Department of the Army, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 600-25, U.S. Army 




Figure 6.   Overview of Special Forces NCO Career Development202 
While SF NCOs might have plenty of opportunity to develop regional proficiency 
through experience, the same cannot be said for PME.  Special Forces NCOs do not 
receive any region specific education in their PME system.203  At the SGM Academy, 
students are strongly encouraged to complete a bachelor’s degree and could conceivably 
tailor it to focus on a region but this would only be near the end of his career.  Building 
upon an NCO background is the next category, Special Forces warrant officers.   
Special Forces Warrant Officers must come from the Special Forces NCO ranks.  
Because of this, it is not uncommon to find WOs with vast amounts of SFODA 
experience.  As with the SF NCO, however, there is considerable variance in WO career 
                                                 
202 From Pedro Padillamendez, CMF 18 Career Manager, “NCO Career Track,” 13 September 2011. 
203 David Walton, Department Chief, Directorate of Regional Studies and Education (DRSE), 
JKFSWCS, correspondence with author, 24 October 2011. 
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progression.  As a result, this thesis takes only the minimum into account.204  Factoring 
in the minimum amount of time as an SF NCO, an SF WO must have at least six years on 
an SFODA.205  This is also a significant amount of time on an ODA to acquire regional 
proficiency.   
As in the case of SF NCOs, there is currently no region-specific education in the 
SF WO PME system.  Unlike the SF NCO, however, the SF WO has more opportunites 
for higher education.  As depicted in Figure 7, there is an education initiative in the SF 
WO branch that almost mirrors the SF Officer’s opportunities.  While in pursuit of both 
his bachelor’s and master’s degrees, an SF WO has the potential to imporove his regional 
proficiency by either getting a degree in regional studies or by taking classes focused on 
his AOR.  It is worth noting, however, SF WO’s have far fewer opportunities to attend 
these programs than do SF Officers.  This leads to the final category, SF Officers. 
                                                 
204 A WO must have a minimum of three years on an SFODA as an SF NCO, before he can become a 
WO.  As either a WO1 or CW2 (the ranks that serve on an SFODA), a WO must successfully serve for 
three years on an SFODA to be eligigble for promotion (see Figure 7). 
205 Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 171. 
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Figure 7.   Overview of Special Forces Warrant Officer Career Development206 
 
                                                 




Figure 8.   Overview of Special Forces Officer Career Development207 
                                                 
207 From David Gaugush, Special Forces Captain/Junior Major Assignment Officer, “Service Timeline: Year Group 00,” 1 September 2011. 
 63 
Special Forces Officers have the least amount of time on a SFODA, but have the 
most opportunities for higher education.  To be eligible for promotion, a Special Forces 
officer must successfully command an SFODA for at least two years (see Figure 8).208  
SF officer PME does not include any region specific education, but in contrast to WO and 
NCO PME, the officer’s required PME, intermediate level education (ILE), offers 
officers numerous educational opportunities.  Several ILE programs are partnered with 
master’s degree producing programs.  If an SF officer elects to focus his master’s degree 
on regional studies or to take regionally oriented classes, the SF officer could improve his 
regional proficiency.  Another opportunity afforded to SF officers is professional 
development programs, such as Foreign Professional Military Education and Regional 
Centers programs.  These programs are designed to enhance interaction with foreign 
militaries and offer excellent methods by which to increase regional proficiency.  The 
best program for increasing regional proficiency is the Olmsted Scholarship Program.  
The Olmsted Scholarship is designed to immerse military officers and their families in a 
foreign culture while “the officer studies in a foreign language in a liberal arts field of 
his/her choice.”209  In this program, an officer learns the targeted language at DLIFLC 
and then attends a foreign university.  Because the program is open to all military 
officers, only a few SF officers are able to participate.   
From this review, it can be seen that there are very few opportunities for a Special 
Forces Soldier to improve his regional proficiency through a structured program in his 
career.  When SF doctrine states that regional proficiency is to be developed through 
formal instruction and deployments, deployment into the region appears to be the primary 
method by which SF Soldiers are expected to develop regional proficiency.  Yet, to 
develop regional proficiency through experience well would require consistent 
deployment to each SF Soldier’s assigned region.  While this may be possible for some 
units, not all units consistently deploy their ODAs.  In fact, in the last decade, deploying 
                                                 
208 Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 169. 
209 AHRC-OPL-L, “Fiscal Year 2012 Olmsted Scholarship Program,” Milper Message Number 11-




outside their assigned AOR has become the norm for some units.  Second, not all 
deployment experiences are equal.  The mission and the amount of required population 
engagement significantly impact the development of regional proficiency. Some 
deployments are very useful for developing regional proficiency.  Deployments as 
military advisors, which require immersion in the targeted culture, are excellent 
opportunities to improve regional proficiency.  Take for an example, the Special 
Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO) and Special Operations Support Team (SOST) 
programs, which are designed to assign SOF personnel to support and enhance host 
nation SOF.210  This role offers an SF Soldier a great opportunity to increase his regional 
proficiency as he interacts on a daily basis with counterparts from a different country.  
Here, too, however, it is worth considering the nature of interaction.  A person relying 
upon host nation expediters while staying at a luxury hotel does not gain as much 
experience in a region as a person who is embedded in a unit.211   Consequently, one can 
expect that a Special Forces Soldier conducting Village Stability Operations will develop 
significantly more regional proficiency than a Soldier who is based on a major forward 
operating base and is primarily conducting unilateral DA missions.  Since experience is 
the dominant method on which Special Forces relies to develop regional proficiency, 
these differences in types of experiences play a significant role in the level of regional 
proficiency that a Special Forces Soldier attains.  
C. EVOLUTION OF COMMANDO AND WARRIOR-DIPLOMAT ROLES 
Right now, again, in my opinion only, we as a force are very confused 
about what the role of Special Forces is. We are an awesome force with so 
much potential, but, unfortunately, it is being squandered with this 
perception that we are a super-infantry/Ranger/[Special Mission Unit] type 
unit. This has to change or I fear our traditional role as the premier UW 
force will be taken by another SOF element (read MARSOC/SEALs) 
while we continue, haphazardly, trying to figure out who we are…212 
—Special Forces Soldier 
                                                 
210 McRaven, “Advanced Policy Questions,” 41. 
211 Varhola et al, “Avoiding the Cookie Cutter Approach to Culture,” 78. 
212 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 24 October 2011. 
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As the two previous sections should make clear, Special Forces doctrine treats 
regional proficiency as extremely important, but provides little institutional training or 
focus on it.  This is because the demands on Special Forces are great.  While the UW 
mission is paramount, Special Forces has numerous core tasks that compete for time, 
resources and attention (see Figure 9).  As Special Forces evolved it adapted to the 
changing environment, redefining itself and adding missions and core tasks. 
  
 
Figure 9.   Special Forces Principal Tasks213 
It is important to note that these nine principle tasks create a broad mission set.  In 
addition to being broad and requiring mastery of numerous skills, these principal tasks 
pull Special Forces in different directions.  To begin the discussion on how these 
principle tasks have affected Special Forces, it is useful to review a monograph written 
by then-Major Kenneth Tovo, titled “Special Forces’ Mission Focus For the Future.”  
The monograph, written in 1995, examined the doctrinal mission focus of Special Forces 
to meet the requirements of the post-Cold War environment.  The mid-1990s was a time 
of drastic defense budget reductions and a changing security environment.  In spite of 
budget reductions, the demands on Special Forces remained high and people within 
Special Forces expected to maintain a high operational tempo for the foreseeable future.   
                                                 
213 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, 2–4. 
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Tovo points to a dichotomy, which he explains as a dual focus, in Special Forces 
doctrine.  On one hand, Special Forces doctrine focuses on indirect missions, which are 
missions that “rely on linguistic, interpersonal, and cross cultural communications skills, 
regional orientation, and training skills to influence indigenous forces.”214  “Warrior-
diplomat” is the label normally associated with this mission set.  It is important to note 
that warrior-diplomat is not a euphemism for non-combatant.  A warrior-diplomat cannot 
turn in his rifle and replace it for a chai set.  Even while taking an indirect approach, 
many of the basic skills that a warrior-diplomat relies on are combat skills.  The other 
focus is on direct missions, which are missions that “rely on the application of firepower, 
technology, and technical skills in a precise and rapid manner to achieve results.”215 The 
label for this mission set is “commando.”  Doctrine expects Special Forces to do both.   
This dual focus can be traced at least as far back as the Vietnam War when 
Special Forces found itself performing both types of missions, both working by, with, and 
through indigenous forces as warrior-diplomats and conducting unilateral direct action 
missions as commandos.  The dichotomy was formalized later in Special Forces doctrine.  
Additionally, as the strategic environment changed in the 1970s and 80s, Special Forces 
continued to adapt and emphasized or added different principal tasks to ensure relevancy.  
For instance, after the Vietnam experience, the Army wanted to put COIN behind it and 
return its focus to conventional wars on European battlefields.  To maintain relevancy in 
the Army, the dominant mission set in Special Forces during this period became direct 
missions suitable to supporting the conventional force.216  Over time, Special Forces 
struggled to stay relevant.  Today this evolution has produced the current nine principal 
tasks and the current dichotomy between direct and indirect missions.   
                                                 
214 Kenneth E. Tovo, “Special Forces’ Mission Focus For the Future,” (monograph, School of 
Advanced Military Studies, 1995), (accessed 23 October 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA309816, 3. 
215 Tovo, “Special Forces’ Mission Focus For the Future,” 3. 
216 Tovo, “Special Forces’ Mission Focus For the Future,” 10. 
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Figure 10.   Categorization of SOF Missions217 
This “direct vs. indirect” dichotomy is as prevalent today as it was in 1995.  It has 
fueled a discussion both within SF and SOF as a whole.  With the advent of the Global 
War On Terror, the debate found new and fertile ground as proponents from both sides 
argued about the best approach to fighting violent extremists.  In United States Special 
Operations Forces, David Tucker and Christopher Lamb analyze Special Operations 
Forces.  By generalizing, it is possible to align the current SOF missions into direct and 
indirect categories (see Figure 10). 
Their categorization is not meant to be a clear-cut, “black and white” delineation.  
Their purpose in breaking SOF missions into direct and indirect categories is to portray 
the diverse skill sets expected of SOF and how they require different approaches and 
sometimes different mentalities.218  Tucker and Lamb argue that it is the mixture of both 
these skill sets that enable SOF to “operate with discrimination in complex political-
military environments that are inhospitable to conventional forces.”219  In fact, the skill 
sets are often complimentary.  For instance, a Special Forces Soldier’s proficiency in the 
direct tasks can grant him access to conduct indirect tasks.  As captured in TC 31-73, 
Special Forces Advisor, “Demonstrated professional competence in one area leads to the 
presumption of competence in other areas.”220  Direct skill sets are often the most easily 
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demonstrated and therefore can serve as the basis of credibility for a Special Forces 
Soldier on an indirect mission.  Additionally, the mission sets can overlap.  For example, 
a direct action mission could be a supporting mission in a larger UW mission.   
While SOF as a whole is conflicted about whether to focus on direct versus 
indirect skills, most units within SOF tend to specialize in one or the other.  The reason 
for this is that units must focus their training and equipment on one mission or another.221 
Most units in SOF are able to do this thanks to a clear understanding of their role(s) and 
their strategic value.  Special Forces, in contrast, straddles the dichotomy.  The nine 
principle tasks of Special Forces cover the entire gamut of direct and indirect missions.  
As a result, there is plenty of opportunity for the dichotomy to introduce tensions into the 
organization.  Within Special Forces, people have the latitude to gravitate to one extreme 
or the other.  At the same time, Special Forces Soldiers only have a limited amount of 
time to train.  Given the autonomy to determine their own training plans, people tend to 
select the training that will either be the most relevant for the immediate future, such as 
the next deployment, or that most interests them.  Some in Special Forces choose to focus 
on the direct skill set.  Others choose to focus on the indirect skill set.  While developing 
expertise is good, when it becomes over-concentrated at the expense of other valuable 
skill sets, it can have a detrimental effect on the mission. The influence of this dichotomy 
on a Special Forces Soldier can be portrayed as two opposing forces pulling him in 
different directions (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.   Direct vs. Indirect Spectrum 
This raises the question where should Special Forces be on the spectrum.  
Relevant to this discussion is the notion of strategic value.  Strategic value is derived 
from three factors: “the intrinsic and distinguishing capabilities of the forces; the nature 
of the most important security challenges facing the nation; and the military requirements 
that emanate from the nation’s strategy for dealing with those challenges.”222  For SOF in 
general, Tucker and Lamb conclude that SOF’s strategic value is best manifested when 
they have the strategic lead (i.e., conducting independent operations or are supported by 
conventional forces).223  When SOF is in the strategic lead, both direct and indirect 
missions have significant strategic value.  Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Military 
Information Support Operations units are the most suitable for the indirect missions while 
other SOF units are more capable for the direct missions.   
When supporting conventional forces (i.e., when not in the strategic lead), the 
strategic value of SOF lessens significantly.  In this context, Lamb and Tucker argue that 
direct missions are of limited utility since they do not require the unique capabilities of 
SOF.  Rather, direct missions in support of conventional forces, such as entering and 
clearing structures, tend to relegate SOF to at best an elite role, rather than conducting a 
truly special operation that requires the unique capabilities inherent in SOF.  Tucker and 
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Lamb define elite units as units that are “used for the same purpose as general-purpose 
forces, but receive special designation, training, and resources so that they may perform 
at a higher level.”224  SOF, in contrast, are “not only elite but special because they 
conduct missions that conventional forces cannot perform, or at least not at acceptable 
levels of risk and costs.”225  Furthermore, Tucker and Lamb caution that an overemphasis 
on using SOF in an elite role places SOF at risk of losing its unconventional mentality.226  
There is a danger that SOF could begin to assume the elite persona it has been asked to 
temporarily perform at the expense of its SOF identity. 
With this concept of what differentiates SOF from elite units, the value of the 
indirect role while supporting conventional forces becomes clear.  While supporting 
conventional forces, SOF provides the most strategic value in an indirect role.  SOF’s 
indirect prowess provides conventional forces with cultural capabilities that they cannot 
easily replicate.  This capability takes years to develop and conventional forces are not 
selected or trained for the cultural capability that Special Forces provides.227  From this 
analysis, it can be concluded that Special Forces’ strategic value is derived from its 
indirect capabilities, with its inherent requirement for regional proficiency.   
After tracing the development of Special Forces doctrine, Tovo examined several 
of Special Forces tasks to determine their significance and suitability for future conflicts.  
In 1995, he predicted that most future conflicts “will take place in a low-technology 
environment against opponents much less susceptible to a firepower- and technology-
based approach.”228 He also predicted that “[s]hrinking U.S. resources will cause 
decision makers to place a premium on the economy of force provided by Special Forces 
in the indirect role.”229  Tovo concluded, “that Special Forces’ greatest contributions 
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have been, and will continue to be, a result of indirect efforts.”230  He found that the 
indirect mission set was what differentiated Special Forces from other SOF and 
conventional forces and that, as a result of this, Special Forces should focus its efforts on 
the indirect mission set.231  With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen sixteen years 
later that Tovo’s assessments and predictions were not far off the mark.   
Indirect skills should receive the priority in emphasis, but a balanced approach is 
needed.  The “warrior-diplomat vs. commando” dichotomy highlights the influences that 
pull on Special Forces.  With its broad mission set, it is easy for Special Forces Soldiers 
to be drawn to one end of the spectrum or another.  Neither extreme is beneficial to the 
Special Forces Regiment.  In his response to Congressional confirmation questions, 
ADM McRaven, USSOCOM Commander stated that SOF needs a balanced approach 
with regard to countering violent extremism.  He stated that “USSOCOM must move 
from a primarily threat-focused approach to a populace-centric approach,” yet “while 
emphasizing the need for the indirect approach, we must not weaken our ability to 
execute direct action when necessary.”232  Though he was speaking about all of 
USSOCOM, this guidance could be directly applied to Special Forces.  Special Forces’ 
strategic value arises from its abilities in the indirect approach, but it must also maintain 
capability in the direct skills sets.  Returning to the direct vs. indirect spectrum, Special 
Forces should seek to be just to the right of the center line (see Figure 12).  Indirect skills 
should dominate, but Special Forces should maintain sufficient ability in direct skills to 
apply them when needed.   
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Figure 12.   Special Forces’ Optimal Position on Direct vs. Indirect Spectrum 
This debate is especially relevant today.  Special Forces has been consistently 
engaged in combat zones for over a decade.  While the dichotomy has been present in 
Special Forces at least since the Vietnam War, the new norm is deployment with limited 
time at home station.  This has led to doctrinal dissonance. 
D. DOCTRINAL DISSONANCE 
Pre-Mission train-ups have become DA centric and Company or Battalion 
run. SFAUC is the sexy thing that drives many PMT's. But where does the 
cultural education and area orientation come from? Granted, combat 
power is central for survival and the ability to control it is a professional 
attribute. We don't concentrate on the basics anymore. These 18Xs are not 
getting a good education of what right is. How many seniors are TRULY 
taking their juniors under their arm, and showing them how to do 
business?  
–Special Forces Soldier233 
Actions speak louder than words.  This adage often proves true, but is especially 
valid when applied to the organizational behavior of U.S. Army Special Forces.  There is 
a potential that with regard to regional proficiency, a distinct difference between written 
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doctrine and organizational behavior, referred to as doctrinal dissonance prevails.234  
Doctrinal dissonance is the subject of Paul Johnston’s article, “Doctrine Is Not Enough.”  
Johnston claims that culture is more important than doctrine in determining how an army 
fights.235 
The two important variables in doctrinal dissonance are doctrine and 
organizational culture.  The Department of Defense defines doctrine as “Fundamental 
principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support 
of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”236  
Despite appearing to guide units’ actions, Johnston argues that doctrine only exercises a 
weak or indirect effect and that organizational culture governs a military’s actions.237  In 
his book, Culture and Related Corporate Realities, Vijay Sathe defines culture as “the set 
of important assumptions (often unstated) that members of a community share in 
common.”238  This definition of culture is relevant for this section as it applies to 
organizational theory.  While often unstated, an army’s culture can be observed through 
“the organization an army adopts for itself, the types of training it chooses to indulge in, 
and indeed, the formal doctrine it chooses to adopt for itself.”239  While doctrine is a 
source of culture, the experiences and value systems of the military’s leaders also play 
important roles in determining the unit’s culture.240  When the culture of a unit does not 
align with the written doctrine, the unit acts in accordance with its culture.  The result is 
doctrinal dissonance.   
The conduct of Special Forces in the last decade provides an excellent example of 
a unit straying significantly from its doctrine because of an evolving organizational 
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culture.  As is evident from the previous discussion, Special Forces doctrine stresses the 
importance of regional proficiency and the Special Forces organization is even designed 
to promote regional proficiency.  In addition, adaptability and versatility are also themes 
within Special Forces doctrine.  Special Forces Groups are not constrained to a particular 
AOR and they could be used to great effect anywhere in the world.  This 
acknowledgement of versatility, however, does not preclude the requirement for regional 
proficiency.  According to doctrine, Special Forces should be regionally proficient.   
However, Special Forces’ actions over the last decade (e.g., deploying outside of 
assigned AORs, not training on cultural capability) appear to contradict the importance of 
regional proficiency.  During the SOF Operator 2020 Workshop hosted by USSOCOM in 
December 2010, several participants highlighted the effects that the last decade of combat 
has had on SOF.  The group consensus was that the last decade was too focused on 
kinetic activities and that many of the younger SOF Operators were raised in a “culture of 
kinetics,” which could be considered the “commando” mentality.241  Many feared that 
this mentality would prevail in SOF and doubts were expressed about whether some SOF 
Operators were capable of operating across the commando-warrior-diplomat spectrum.242  
These concerns surfaced in the discussion about the lack of experience in Phase 0 and 
Phase I activities, which rely heavily on the indirect approach (see Figure 13).243  While 
the workshop addressed SOF in general, these concerns particularly apply to Special 
Forces.  The last decade has seen an overemphasis on direct action within Special Forces 
and, as a result, Special Forces indirect skills, especially regional proficiency, have 
atrophied.   
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Figure 13.   Phased campaign model244 
In fact, combat operations in 2001 began with Special Forces units that had no 
regional proficiency in the area.  In a Frontline interview, then-COL John Mulholland, 
the 5th Special Forces Group Commander, said that one of his greatest concerns about 
the invasion of Afghanistan was “our lack of precise cultural and tribal knowledge of 
Afghanistan because that is a hallmark of what we do.”245  Afghanistan was new to 5th 
Group.  There had been little association with the country since the 1980s and 5th Group 
lacked regional proficiency when it went into combat.246  Despite not knowing the 
language or culture, Special Forces SFODAs used their 3C skills to adapt and 
successfully embed with Northern Alliance military forces to overthrow the Taliban 
regime.   
Johnston writes that a military changes its culture, or “mindset,” in response to 
vivid experiences.247  It is possible that 5th SFG(A)’s success in combat without regional 
proficiency and the follow-on successes of other Groups in combat deployments outside 
their AORs changed the culture of Special Forces.  For the last ten years, the importance 
of regional proficiency has continued to be stressed in doctrine, but many within Special 
Forces were no longer acting to improve regional proficiency.  Instead, many Special 
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Forces units used their valuable and finite training time to prepare for direct action 
combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Working outside their assigned AORs became 
the norm.  In his written testimony to Congress, ADM McRaven indicated that the high 
operations tempo (OPTEMPO) since 9/11 and the Central Command (CENTCOM) focus 
have degraded the cultural capabilities of SOF personnel.  He went on to say that the 
compressed time between deployments has negatively impacted SOF’s ability to train 
and educate the force.248      
It could be argued that regional proficiency was the first victim of the high rate of 
deployments outside of most Groups’ AORs.  SFODAs were not afforded opportunities 
to immerse themselves in their assigned region’s culture.  As a result, individuals saw 
little point in studying a region that they knew they would never deploy to.  In fact, in an 
effort to produce Special Forces soldiers faster, much of the regional proficiency training 
was eliminated from the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).  A Needs 
Assessment conducted by Norwich University in 2010 determined that the SFQC 
provided only a limited amount of cultural training and no regional education.249  It is 
possible that a 10-year veteran of Special Forces has only known deployments outside of 
his AOR and that his training and deployments have been focused exclusively on direct 
combat skills.  This focus on combat would mean that for almost his entire career, such a 
Special Forces Soldier would have never trained on regional proficiency. 
Choices in training reflect a unit’s culture.  Currently, more emphasis is given to 
training for direct action missions.  Many units are in a cycle of repeat deployments to 
combat zones.  During the few months that they are in garrison, these units focus on 
preparing for the next combat deployment.  As a result, training is dominated by Special 
Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC), which is often training organized at the 
battalion level.  What little time remains is devoted to developing the advanced individual 
skills that will be required for the next deployment.  Then, as part of a battalion, SFODAs 
deploy to a combat zone.  Taken as a single event, this makes perfect sense and is what 
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would be expected of any unit.  Units focus their training on the next mission.  The 
problem arises when this focus on DA and battalion level deployments becomes 
systemic.  When this is not just one event, but the norm, there is a potential that the entire 
organizational culture will change.  If the only thing a unit does is train on SFAUC, 
deploy to combat, conduct DA missions, redeploy, train on SFAUC, deploy to combat, 
etc., the unit could easily become DA focused, sliding to the direct extreme on the 
spectrum.  Worse, the organization could adopt the elite mentality previously discussed 
and lose its sense of special operations.  An indicator of this would be a lack of regional 
proficiency development over the past decade.  This could suggest that the culture within 
Special Forces has shifted and, as a result, Special Forces no longer acts in accordance 
with its own doctrine. 
Other organizational culture indicators are the values and experiences of the 
leaders.  Current leaders in Special Forces have experienced combat in Afghanistan or 
Iraq which for the majority was not their assigned AOR.  Successful command in combat 
is commonly thought to be a favorable factor for promotion to the higher positions within 
Special Forces.  If true, this suggests that the current and future Special Forces leaders 
have been successful within the organization without developing or utilizing regional 
proficiency.  As a result, it has lost some of its value within the organization as indicated 
by the small amount of time devoted to regional proficiency in both initial and 
sustainment training.  This disregard for regional proficiency within Special Forces could 
become systemic.  Johnston suggests that since leaders of organizations tend to hire and 
promote people who reflect their values, a culture of leaders tend to become self-
replicating.250  Leaders who have risen in the last decade could have drifted sufficiently 
far away from the indirect portion of the spectrum that an emphasis on direct skills will 
become the new norm. 
This cultural shift away from regional proficiency within Special Forces is a 
consequence of doctrinal dissonance.  Current Special Forces doctrine continues to stress 
the importance of regional proficiency, yet many Special Forces units and individuals 
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may no longer value it.  Rather than becoming experts at understanding specific 
environments, some Special Forces units might devote more of their energies and 
resources to preparing for the next direct action focused combat rotation.  Johnston’s 
theory about doctrinal dissonance should serve as a warning.  If Special Forces is to 
regain its orientation toward regional proficiency, it will require more than a new 
emphasis on its doctrine.  Another cultural shift will have to occur to realign the 
organization closer to the doctrine.  The only other option is to rewrite Special Forces 
doctrine and, as a result, lose strategic value.  To examine the extent of doctrinal 
dissonance within Special Forces, the current state of the Special Forces Regiment will be 
examined next.   
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IV. STATE OF THE REGIMENT 
We (Green Berets) need more Area Familiarization.  It is becoming a lost 
art as the older Soldiers retire.  We are losing our ability to understand and 
organize the populace, a skill set which sets us (set us) apart from 
everyone else. 
–Special Forces Soldier251 
A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT (LCNA) PROJECT 
Between 2010 and 2011, the Special Operations Forces Language Office 
(SOFLO) contracted SWA Consulting to conduct a language and culture needs 
assessment project.  SWA Consulting interviewed and surveyed units across USSOCOM.  
Most of these studies concentrated on the language aspect of cultural capability, but 
several reports focused on cultural and regional knowledge.  Some of the findings in 
these reports help inform the discussion about regional proficiency in Special Forces.  It 
is important to note that these reports surveyed all of USSOCOM, not just Special Forces.  
I note it whenever the results apply specifically to Special Forces.  Additionally, when 
SWA Consulting conducted its research, it did not use the cultural capability components 
that were identified in Chapter I.  Rather, SWA Consulting framed its research around 
two components: language training and cultural training.  Cultural training included both 
3C and regional competence.   
1. SOF PERSPECTIVE ON CULTURAL CAPABILITY TRAINING 
The LCNA found that both SOF operators and leaders believe that cultural 
training should be at least moderately emphasized during training.  Within ARSOF, the 
LCNA found that Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO) Soldiers value all but one cultural training topic more than Special Forces 
Soldiers.  The exception was history of conflict in the deployment region.  SWA 
Consulting suggested that this was either because CA and MISO require a higher level of 
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cultural understanding or “SF operators think that culture is better learned in country as 
opposed to training, which can be inaccurate (i.e., SF operators commented that culture 
training was often not accurate or relevant for deployment location because of tribal or 
local customs).”252   
USSOCOM’s guidance is that prior to every deployment, SOF personnel should 
have “at least 40 hours of mixed language and cultural training.”253  The LCNA found 
there was a large degree of variance in the implementation of this guidance (see Figure 
14). 
 
Figure 14.   Average Reported Culture Training Length by USASOC Organization254 
Explanations for this were found in the comments provided by survey 
respondents.  One common barrier to cultural capability training was said to be a lack of 
time for or command emphasis on cultural training.255  Cultural training was one of the 
first things to be eliminated when the unit received additional tasks.  The cultural training 
that was received was generally thought to be effective by the recipients.  The LCNA 
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noted a correlation between the length of the culture training and its perceived 
effectiveness; the longer the training, the more effective the training was believed to be 
by the participants.256 When the training was considered ineffective the reason 
commonly given was that it was not immediately relevant.  Cultural training that was 
thought to be too academic or not specifically relevant to a particular deployment was not 
considered useful.257    
2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING CULTURAL 
CAPABILITY 
LCNA found that a common recommendation for improving both language and 
cultural ability within SOF was to use immersion training.  The focus for immersion 
training in the report was with regard to developing language ability, but its benefit with 
regard to regional proficiency was also mentioned.  Immersion training could be 
conducted in “a country where the language is spoken, in the United States where the 
language is spoken in an isolated community or in a simulated environment with native 
speakers.”258  Immersion programs were “overwhelmingly described as effective and 
useful” by the LCNA surveyed population.259  The SWA research suggests that the 
reported benefits of immersion training would make it an effective tool to develop 
cultural capability.260   This value placed on immersion training was again found in the 
survey and interview research conducted for this thesis.  
Another group that emphatically endorses the idea of immersion training is 
students interviewed for this thesis.  Most believed that their instruction was insufficient 
and that they would only be able to develop true regional proficiency by being there or to 
use their term, “smelling the dirt of the place.” This is telling since respondents were in 
the midst of receiving formal regional proficiency instruction, yet said they valued what 
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they were not receiving (experience) more.  This might have been influenced by their 
environment.  The typical IRS student is a recent SFQC graduate.  IRS is a form of 
purgatory.  The student is no longer a SFQC student, but still does not receive the 
benefits or respect of being a full-fledged Special Forces Soldier.  Meanwhile, his peers 
have been fully integrated into the SFG(A)s.  IRS students said that their peers and 
sponsors from the SFG(A)s were telling them that their training was useless “because we 
will just use interpreters when we get there.”261  They urged the IRS students that they 
needed to hurry up and get to the SFG(A)s so that they could deploy and develop “real” 
regional knowledge.  Research indicates, however, that immersion training is not 
sufficient.     
SWA research suggests that formal learning (e.g., classroom instruction) and 
informal learning (e.g., on-the-job) play unique roles in developing cultural capability. 262  
A survey of research on the subject by SWA reveals that there are several options for 
developing cultural capability.  The report lists:   
 Didactic training – information-giving training (i.e. formal 
instruction.). 
 Cultural awareness training – identifying and comparing one’s own 
values and cultures with other region’s values and cultures. 
 Interaction training – on-the-job training with a mentor. 
 Experiential training – learning by doing. 
 Language training – “exchanging common courtesies in the target 




                                                                                                                                                 
260 SWA Consulting, “Immersion Training,” 44. 
261 Special Forces Soldier, interview with the author, 28 September 2011. 
262 SWA Consulting, “Cultural Awareness and Knowledge Training,” 27. 
263 SWA Consulting, “Cultural Awareness and Knowledge Training,” 28. 
 83 
The most effective method of instruction would therefore be a hybrid approach that 
blends both formal and informal methods.  To quote the SWA report, “Experiential 
learning may work best for building cultural awareness, but SOF operators need to know 
what types of cultural information to look for, therefore, the classroom component fills 
that gap.”264  This is not to detract from the value of immersion training.  It can be a very 
effective means to develop regional proficiency, especially when formal instruction is 
incorporated into it.  Experiential training cannot, however, be relied upon as the sole 
means of development.  Formal instruction, such as classroom education, plays an 
important role as well.   
Interestingly, the LCNA found that SOF operators are more motivated by non-
monetary than monetary incentives for language acquisition.  The best non-monetary 
incentives are: “saving lives/force protection, mission success, supporting the team, 
immersion opportunities, and self-development.”265  Despite the presence of these non-
monetary incentives, the LCNA notes that monetary incentives are still an “important and 
powerful motivational tool for most individuals” and are still related to the “proficiency 
acquisition and maintenance in the SOF community.”266  The LCNA suggests that the 
incentive structure for language proficiency should combine both monetary and non-
monetary incentives. 267 
In conclusion, SWA recommends three best practices for developing cultural 
capability.  First, cultural capability training should incorporate multiple delivery 
strategies.  Second, the training delivery should be aligned with the training goals (i.e., 
training should be relevant).  Finally, training should occur “prior to deployment, 
immediately after deployment, or both.”268  
 
                                                 
264 SWA Consulting, “Cultural Awareness and Knowledge Training,” 27. 
265 SWA Consulting, “Non-monetary Incentives,” Special Operations Forces Language and Culture 
Needs Assessment Project (November 2010), 2. 
266 SWA Consulting, “Non-monetary Incentives,” 2. 
267 SWA Consulting, “Non-monetary Incentives,” 2. 
268 SWA Consulting, “Cultural Awareness and Knowledge Training,” 29. 
 84 
B. SURVEY OVERVIEW 
I think a decade of war has made SF guys less open-minded, not more. 
That is the cause of the language, cultural, and area knowledge issues we 
face. The SF job needs to be more clearly defined when it comes to those 
aptitudes, and those aptitudes need to be promoted more in the command 
environment. Right now, cultural and language proficiency is an 
afterthought at best; it is viewed with suspicion at worst.  
–Special Forces Soldier269 
SWA findings were reinforced by the survey conducted for this thesis.  As 
mentioned in Chapter I, a part of the research for this thesis was a survey administered to 
the current Special Forces Regiment over a two month period.  The survey was created 
using the online survey service, Survey Monkey.  The survey was administered online.  A 
hyperlink to the survey was distributed by e-mail.  Through various distribution lists, the 
e-mail was sent to active members of the Special Forces Regiment.  The population size 
of the Special Forces Regiment is approximately 7,700.270  Over 700 Special Forces 
Soldiers responded.  Of these responses, approximately 540 responses were usable for 
analysis.  The other responses were not usable because the survey was only partially 
completed and prevented the calculation of some of the values.  Survey participation 
therefore roughly equates to 7% of the Special Forces Regiment.  While the number of 
respondents (n = 540) was large enough to conduct meaningful statistical analysis, the 
percentage (7%) is relatively small.  This is important to keep in mind when reading the 
rest of the chapter.  Like all surveys, conclusions drawn from this survey should be taken 
with a dose of skepticism.  The 7% may or may not represent the Regiment.  Elicitation 
for the survey was straightforward and the survey itself was labeled a Regional 
Proficiency Survey.  From the title alone, people might have self-selected and elected to 
not participate because they had no interest in anything to do with regional proficiency.  
If there was a self-selection bias, results would be skewed and it would not accurately 
represent the Regiment.  Despite this possibility, the number of responses was still 
                                                 
269 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 18 October 2011. 
270 George McGrath, ARSOF Branch Chief, correspondence with the author, 25 October 2011 and 
David Gaugush, “Special Forces Branch Brief,” 3 December 2010.  
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significant.  Analysis of the survey reveals several interesting patterns.  Before discussing 
them, let me review who participated in the survey.   
1. Population Overview 
I would add that it is very difficult to dedicate the amount of time required 
to become well versed in various AOR's when we are deploying to and 
focused on Iraq and Afghanistan more than our actual AOR's… it is 
difficult convincing someone of the importance of learning Spanish or 
French when they are spending the majority of their time in Afghanistan.  
–Special Forces Soldier271 
Several factors influence a person’s perspective.  Factors that were considered 
influential in the construction of the survey were a person’s grade, assigned Special 
Forces Group (Airborne), and experience.  The first category reviewed is grade (see 
Figure 15).  
                                                 
271 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 22 October 2011. 
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Figure 15.   Survey Population by Grade 
As seen in the above chart, O4s composed almost 25% of the survey population, 
followed by O3s, E7s, E8s and E6s.   
Participation of 10th SFG(A) was significantly higher than that of the other 
SFG(A)s (see Figure 16).  In contrast, participation by the two ARNG SFG(A)’s was 
relatively small.  This adversely affects the applicability of the survey analysis to the two 
ARNG SFG(A)s.   
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Figure 16.   Survey Population by SFG(A) 
“Experience” was calculated as a ratio of time spent in/outside the assigned AOR 
as a percentage of total time spent in Special Forces (see Figure 17).   
 
Figure 17.       Ratio of Time In and Outside AOR 
Soldiers who identified with 3
rd
 SFG(A) and 5
th
 SFG(A), the SFG(A)s with primary 
responsibility for the CENTCOM missions, have spent the majority of their time in their 
assigned AORs.  Interestingly, Soldiers from the remaining SFG(A)s have spent  
relatively the same amount of time both in and outside their assigned AOR.  Upon joining 
Special Forces, a Special Forces Soldier, regardless of SFG(A), spends approximately 
30% of his time deployed.     
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Figure 18.       Ratio of Time In AOR by 9/11 Category 
Interestingly, Soldiers in 3
rd
 SFG(A) and 5
th
 SFG(A) who joined Special Forces 
after 9/11 have significantly more time in their AOR than those with greater than ten 
years in Special Forces (Figure 18).  Surprisingly, there is not a high degree of variance 
in the remaining SFG(A)s.  This suggests that perhaps the CENTCOM deployments has 
not seriously affected the other SFG(A)s’ experience in their AORs.    
A final snapshot gleaned from the survey is the interest in higher education within 
Special Forces.  This finding will help inform the strategy presented in Chapter V.  The 
survey indicates that 42% of SFODA members are taking or recently took college 
accredited courses.   
2. Direct vs. Indirect Spectrum 
The next issue to be examined is perceptions about the direct-indirect dichotomy 
discussed in Chapter III.  Special Forces Soldiers’ perception about the value of direct 
skills vs. indirect skills is considered first by SFG(A)s (see Figure 19).  What comes 
through is that Special Forces still places a significantly higher value on indirect over 
direct skills.   
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Figure 19.   Direct vs. Indirect Values by SFG(A) 
To represent this direct vs. indirect valuation slightly differently, the average 
Special Forces Soldier’s position is placed on the direct-indirect spectrum introduced in 
Chapter III (see Figure 20).   
 
Figure 20.       Average Special Forces Soldier Value of Direct vs. Indirect Skills 
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In aggregate, Special Forces Soldiers’ opinion about the value of direct over 
indirect skills falls well to the right of the middle, within the optimal zone.  When this is 
reconsidered by unit level, interesting differences reveal themselves (see Figure 21) 
 
Figure 21.   Direct vs. Indirect Skills by Unit Level 
Although still valuing indirect skills more, the gap is closest in unit level, SFODA 
members.  When presented on the spectrum, the difference between SFODA members 
and the average Special Forces Soldier (all unit levels) becomes clear (see Figure 22).   
 
Figure 22.       SFODA Member Value of Direct vs. Indirect Skills 
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It is interesting that SFODA members, who are the individuals who interact the 
most with the population are also the closest to the direct side of the spectrum.  Perhaps 
this is because SFODA members are also the ones most likely to be involved in combat.  
Beyond this initial explanation, the drift towards the direct side of the spectrum could 
also reflect the experiences and interests of those more junior in rank and/or this drift 
toward direct skills could be a manifestation of the doctrinal dissonance previously 
mentioned.  
C. TREND ANALYSIS 
The first thing that was noticed while conducting statistical analysis is that each 
Special Forces Group does indeed exhibit unique characteristics.  The idea that each 
Special Forces Group has its own personality is a commonly held belief within the 
Regiment and it is often the source of good natured ribbing and inter-Group rivalries.  
The uniqueness of each Group revealed itself in the survey data when it was analyzed to 
determine patterns and trends.  Given the peculiarities of each Group, the focus of this 
thesis is the Special Forces Regiment as a whole.  As a result the discussion will attempt 
to remain at the Regiment level except when the discussion warrants an examination of a 
specific Group.   
Despite the brevity of the survey, a large amount of data was gathered that opened 
the possibility of examining numerous aspects of Special Forces and its relationship with 
cultural capability.  To remain concise and focused, the survey analysis will be limited to 
the interest in regional proficiency within Special Forces.  An important distinction needs 
to be made.  Except for language scores, performance was not measured.  The survey 
measured people’s beliefs and interests.  While reviewing the data and analysis it is 
important to remember that these numbers do not represent actual capability in regional 
proficiency.  Rather, they measure people’s interests and beliefs. 
When designing the survey, it was necessary to hypothesize which factors 
contribute to a Special Forces Soldier’s interest in regional proficiency.  From this list of 
factors (or independent variables) a model was created (see Figure 23).   
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Figure 23.   Regional Proficiency Independent Variables 
Hypothesis 1 was that a person’s inclination (direct versus indirect) would influence his 
regional proficiency.  Hypothesis 2 was that interest in regional proficiency would be 
influenced by a person’s experiences in Special Forces.  Hypothesis 3 was that a person’s 
happiness with his AOR would affect his interest in learning about his AOR.   
This model proved to be reasonably accurate.  In regression analysis, the R-
squared value for this system was high enough (.7154) to be statistically significant (see 
Table 3).  While some of the results were expected, other relationships that the analysis 
revealed were surprising.       
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Table 3.   Regional Proficiency Interest (Total SF) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (Total SF) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 










Number of Observations: 495 R-Squared: .715 
 
1. Personal Inclination 
Hypothesis 1 was validated by the analysis.  If a Special Forces Soldier’s 
inclination is towards the indirect side of the spectrum, he is more likely to be interested 
in regional proficiency.  A person’s inclination was measured in several different ways 
(see Appendix B).  The two dominating factors in determining a person’s interest relate 
to his beliefs: his belief in the indirect approach (i.e., warrior-diplomat score), and belief 
in the utility of regional competence.  Of the two, belief in regional competence played a 
significantly larger role.  The relationship between regional competence utility and 
interest in regional proficiency is obvious and this helps explain the strong correlation.272  
Special Forces Soldiers are pragmatic.  If a Special Forces Soldier thinks regional 
 
                                                 
272 This close relationship could also have been a result of selection bias or poor survey design.  Some 
Special Forces Soldiers could believe that regional competence is useful and still have no interest in 
developing it themselves.  Exploring this relationship further requires another survey better designed to 
mask its intent to draw out a person’s belief on these two closely related topics.  
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knowledge is useful then he will be interested in developing it.  From this, one can 
conclude that to increase regional proficiency the relevance of this knowledge needs to be 
made clear to the Special Forces Soldier.   
The significance of the influence of the warrior-diplomat score, meanwhile is that 
the more the Special Forces Soldier values the indirect mission, the more likely he will be 
to be interested in regional proficiency.  Therefore, to increase interest in regional 
proficiency, the importance and value of indirect missions should be stressed to Special 
Forces Soldiers.   
Another interesting result of the analysis is the statistically insignificant role that 
interest in the “advise and assist” mission has on interest in regional proficiency.  To find 
the role that interest in this mission played, analysis for the warrior-diplomat mentality 
had to be conducted. 
Given the importance of the warrior-diplomat mentality in determining interest in 
regional proficiency, a model for the warrior-diplomat mentality was constructed (see 
Figure 24).  This R-squared value was low (.34), indicating that the model did not fully 
capture the elements that influence the warrior-diplomat mentality (see Appendix B).  Of 
the elements evaluated, three variables were statistically significant.  In contrast to 
interest in regional proficiency, interest in the “advise and assist” mission did influence a 
person’s warrior-diplomat mentality.  In addition, command environment also played an 
important role in determining a person’s warrior-diplomat mentality.  One peculiarity of 
the analysis is the minor influence that time outside an AOR has on the warrior-diplomat 
mentality.  According to the regression analysis, the more time a person spent outside his 
AOR, the more likely it is his warrior-diplomat score will be slightly higher.  This 
relationship is peculiar and is not easily explained.  It is possible that for most Special 
Forces Soldiers, deployment outside of their AOR meant deployments to Afghanistan or 
Iraq.  This trend could imply that these experiences gave Special Forces Soldiers a 
slightly better appreciation for indirect skills.    
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Figure 24.   Warrior-Diplomat Independent Variables 
 
2. Experience 
One surprising result was the influence that a person’s experience has on his 
interest in regional proficiency.  As discussed in Chapter III, deployment outside of the 
assigned AOR has had a detrimental effect on regional proficiency within Special Forces.  
An assumption is that in addition to having a negative impact on regional proficiency 
capability, deploying outside the AOR would have a negative impact on interest in 
regional proficiency as well.  Surprisingly, however, experience did not significantly 
shape a person’s interest in regional proficiency.  In addition to this, time spent in his 
AOR did not significantly influence a person’s interest in either direction.  From this it 
could be concluded that interest in regional proficiency is not dependent upon personal 
experience, but upon the command environment and personal interests.   
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3. Happiness with AOR   
While time spent in or outside of an AOR did not shape a person’s interest, 
contentment with their AOR did influence individual’s interest.  Each AOR is unique.  
The fit between the person and his assigned AOR influenced whether he was interested in 
regional proficiency.  In other words, if the person was happy with his AOR, then he was 
more likely to be interested in regional proficiency. 
4. Incentives 
In addition to testing these hypotheses, the survey also polled participants on 
various means that might be used to incentivize Special Forces Soldiers to improve 
regional proficiency.  A simple rank ordering provides some insight into what would be 
valued (see Figure 25).   
  
 
Figure 25.   Incentives by Unit Level 
Interestingly, the appeal of incentives appears to be influenced by the person’s 
position in his career.  Those on an SFODA or who have recently left an SFODA (i.e., 
company level) value SFODA time the most.  Those with the least pay, namely SFODA 
members, value incentive pay the most.  Additionally, those with typically the lowest 
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level of education, typically SFODA members and SFODA leaders, value college credit 
more than do others.  Notably, the “no incentive” option was tied to a sense of 
professional responsibility.  This was either the highest or second highest option selected 
across the entire Regiment.   
5. Command Environment 
[C]ommand must highlight it more often and from their first days at 
SWCS.  SF soldiers must understand that understanding the operational 
environment is at least as important as hitting a bulls-eye and how many 
pushups they can do. New SWCS students need also to be presented with 
concrete case studies on how regional proficiency affects mission 
accomplishment. 
—Special Forces Soldier273 
 
Beyond these incentives, another influence on Special Forces with regard to 
interest in regional proficiency is leadership.  In regression analysis, the command 
environment proved to be a more influential motivator than any of the incentives listed 
above (see Appendix B).  This correlation between command environment and regional 
proficiency was found throughout the research of this thesis.  As mentioned previously, 
the LCNA found a major hindrance to cultural training was lack of command emphasis.  
Commenting on a negative command environment, one survey respondent wrote:   
There needs to be a true commitment by the Groups and their leadership to 
put some kind of regional studies/language enhancement program in place. 
Currently, regional studies/language receives very little, if any, priority for 
training; mainly because the command puts no priority into 
language/regional studies. I actually had a battalion commander stand in 
front of us and say there was no need for language. He said, “I learned 
Egyptian Arabic 15 years ago and never needed it, so worry about 
shooting and killing bad guys." Essentially, the atmosphere is to learn 
“5.56 with 9mm slang.”274 
 
This vignette is disturbing.  Thankfully this poor command environment is an exception.  
According to the survey, most Special Forces Soldiers experience a moderately positive 
                                                 
273 Special Forces Soldier, correspondence with the author, 22 November 2011. 
274 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 22 October 2011. 
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command environment with regard to regional proficiency (see Figure 26).  While 
positive, this does not mean there is no room for improvement.  A commander’s 
influence can not be underestimated.  When determining how to increase interest in 
regional proficiency, the command environment should be the prime consideration. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Command Environment by SFG(A) 
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V. IMPROVING REGIONAL PROFICIENCY: A STRATEGY 
In today’s operating environment, the demand is much greater for SOF 
operators with varying languages, more cultural attunement, and regional 
expertise. 
—ADM William McRaven, Commander, USSOCOM275  
Regional proficiency is complex and Special Forces is a large and diverse 
organization.  There is no one magical lever that can be pulled to fix this problem.  
Rather, Special Forces should adopt a strategy with several sub-components.  Ideally, all 
sub-components would be implemented, but failing that, implementing only a few would 
still be progress towards increased regional proficiency.  This strategy is based on the 
concept described by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. in the U.S. Army War College Guide to 
Strategy.  According to Lykke, Strategy = Ends + Means + Ways.  Ends are the 
objectives of the strategy.  Means are the resources required for the strategy.  Ways are 
the courses of action for achieving the strategy.276     
Developing regional proficiency does not occur in a vacuum.  Special Forces 
Soldiers are busy.  To quote a survey respondent:  
Although I consider being knowledgeable about my AOR to be a 
professional responsibility, SF Soldiers are expected to maintain multiple 
proficiencies simultaneously (language, physical fitness, cultural 
understanding, weapons, demolition, communications, medical, etc.).  
There are only so many hours in the day, and very few days in between 
deployments, JCETs, and schools/courses.277   
Taking these demands seriously, I designed the strategy with modest goals.  Furthermore, 
most of the means suggested are intended to accomplish multiple objectives.  Finally, 
these methods will not require excessive changes from normal operating procedures. 
                                                 
275 McRaven, “Advanced Policy Questions,” 30.  
276 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr.,  “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” in U.S. Army War College 
Guide to Strategy,  edited by Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb,  February 2001.  (accessed 13 
November 2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy/13lykke.pdf, 180. 
277 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 25 October 2011. 
 100 
A. ENDS–THE OBJECTIVE 
Language and cultural skills are important if we are to maintain our 
historical relevance. These areas have been set aside due to the necessities 
of the current conflicts. As that need passes we need to look at going back 
to our traditional bread and butter, or relook at what it means to be SF in a 
world full of "SOF". 
–Special Forces Soldier278 
The goal of this strategy is to create two RP 3-qualified Special Forces Soldiers 
on each SFODA.  There are three factors in this objective, the level (SFODA), the quality 
(RP 3), and the quantity (two).  Why SFODA level?  Because this is Special Forces 
primary operational unit and is the level most likely to engage with a foreign population.  
Why RP 3? Because an RP 3–qualified individual possesses sufficient in-depth 
knowledge on an area to understand the environment, advise senior officials and to make 
informed judgments.  It is reasonable to assume that a veteran Special Forces Soldier 
should be capable of acquiring sufficient education and experience to meet the RP 3 
criteria.  The quantity of two was selected because while RP 3 is obtainable, it would still 
be difficult to obtain.  Regional proficiency is not for everyone.  Realistically speaking, 
every Special Forces Soldier would not be capable or interested in achieving RP 3.  Also, 
as with all other units in the military, there is a constant rotation of personnel on 
SFODAs.  Not everyone on an SFODA will be a veteran.  Only a few SFODA members 
generally have sufficient experience in Special Forces to even be eligible for RP3, let 
alone sufficient experience in a particular region.  The idea is that while there would only 
be two RP 3s, there would be several Special Forces Soldiers who would be RP 2, ideally 
in the process of becoming RP 3.  Another reason to strive for two per team is 
redundancy, which is inherent to the SFODA’s design.   
 
                                                 
278 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 12 October 2011. 
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B. MEANS–WHAT CAN BE USED 
AOR knowledge and experience takes a vast amount of time both through 
mission in the AOR with host nation militaries and through academic 
study and language programs in those countries.  More time on small 
study visits by teams or parts of teams would enhance the knowledge 
about an AOR.  These study trips, 3-6 months in duration, at local 
universities would help build a deeper understanding and attachment to the 
AOR. 
–Special Forces Soldier279 
Improving regional proficiency, as we have seen is not a new concern.  Both 
within Special Forces and across DoD as a whole, various programs and approaches have 
been developed to improve regional proficiency.  To better catalog these available means, 
I will use the same categories that SWCS uses to outline its lifelong learning project.  
These are: experience, training, and education.  Experience is “the sum of all our 
activities or exposure to events or people over a period of time.”280  Training is “task-
specific learning under controlled conditions to a predetermined standard.”281   Education 
is “the acquisition of knowledge specifically designed to foster diverse perspectives, 
critical analysis, comfort with ambiguity and abstract reasoning with respect to complex 
non-linear problem solving.” 282  For the purposes of this thesis, training will generally 
consist of the instruction provided by military institutions.  Education will generally 
consist of the instruction provided by academic institutions.  This is not to suggest that 
education does not occur at military institutions.  As noted by SWCS, “training and 
education are not mutually exclusive.”283  The simplification is merely intended to 
separate the approaches.   
                                                 
279 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 14 November 2011. 
280 David Walton, “SWCS Education Program,” briefing to JSOU Conference on Education, 9 
September 2011. 
281 Walton, “SWCS Education Program.” 
282 Walton, “SWCS Education Program.” 
283 Walton, “SWCS Education Program.” 
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1. Experience 
Experience in foreign countries has long been considered by USASOC to be an 
excellent means by which to develop regional proficiency.  The value USASOC places 
on experience can be found in the Investment line of effort in the ARSOF Capstone 
Project 2010: 
Global ARSOF presence is a key supporting effort to the Department of 
State and GCCs’ strategies in semi-permissive and unstable areas of the 
world.  The ARSOF Investment line of effort is primarily realized by 
small teams of ….personnel studying, living, and working for extended 
periods of time in overseas locations to gain understanding, acquire 
regional expertise, and develop relationships… Additionally, the 
Investment line of effort allows for the development and sustainment of 
long-term relationships with indigenous personnel and enables a cadre of 
language-capable and culturally relevant Soldiers who provide 
Ambassadors, GCCs, and follow-on forces with critical capabilities should 
emergencies arise or contingencies develop.284 
Experience is developed through major deployments supporting named operations (i.e., 
Operation NEW DAWN, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, etc.), individual 
assignments overseas, engagement events, and so on.  Engagement event is an umbrella 
term for a collection of programs with various missions and funding sources, to include 
Partnership Development Program (PDP), Bilateral Exchange (BILAT), 
Counternarcoterrorism (CNT) Training, and Military-to-Military Program (M2M).  The 
most common program is the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET).  Despite 
different goals and funding sources, most engagement events share the same 
characteristics.  They typically consist of one to two SFODAs and typically last 30-60 
days.285  Not only are these engagement events designed to further GCC goals by 
strengthening partner nations’ militaries, but the engagement event allows SFODA’s to 
practice their training skills and improve their regional proficiency.286 Critical to 
                                                 
284 USASOC, ARSOF Capstone Concept 2010, 7. 
285 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, C-1. 
286 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, C-2. 
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developing regional proficiency through experience are the concepts of consistent 
deployment, persistent engagement, and immersion. 
a. Consistent Deployment 
If the Regiment wants regional proficiency then we cannot continue to 
change unit AORs every month or with every command change.  In 3 
years my team’s AOR has changed 5 times.  I could dedicate every hour 
of every day to regional proficiency and still not be able to cover 5 AORs. 
–Special Forces Soldier287 
In the last ten years, Special Forces did an admittedly poor job of 
deploying units consistently to their assigned AORs.288  Engagements in CENTCOM 
necessitated a constant rotation of different units into that one AOR.  Overwhelmed by 
the demands of the CENTCOM missions, some units consistently deployed outside of 
their AOR.  To help compensate for the increased demand for Special Forces, Special 
Forces grew, adding a fourth battalion to every active duty SFG(A). 289  Additionally, the 
SFG(A)s were re-aligned to reflect CENTCOM’s operational demand.290  Considering 
these measures, the withdrawal from Iraq, and the drawdown in Afghanistan, it is 
reasonable to assume that the next decade will not be like the last decade with its 
overwhelming CENTCOM focus.  It is reasonable to assume that the Special Forces 
Regiment will be able to resume its method of consistently deploying units to the same 
region within aligned AORs.  Ideally, Special Forces Groups will be able to assign 
regions to subordinate battalions, which will in turn assign smaller regions to companies.  
With specific regions to focus on, Special Forces Soldiers will be able to concentrate 
their efforts on developing regional proficiency.  By specializing and consistently 
deploying to the same area, Special Forces Soldiers will once again profit from 
experiential learning and develop regional proficiency. 
                                                 
287 Special Forces Soldier, survey response, 22 October 2011. 
288 McRaven, “Advanced Policy Questions,” 29. 
289 McRaven, “Advanced Policy Questions,” 35–36. 
290 McRaven, “Advanced Policy Questions,” 30. 
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b. Persistent Engagement 
I think the future of the long war or Global War on Terror will 
predominantly be persistent operations in countries with which the U.S. is 
not at war, leveraging locals… And so the key will be to have a distributed 
global presence where we are working with lots of locals to suppress this 
global insurgency down to very low levels. 
–Michael Vickers291 
Tied to the concept of consistent deployment is the idea of persistent 
engagement.  As mentioned before, most engagement events tend to involve at least one 
SFODA and be of a short duration, but with a high level of activity.  At times this 
approach is the only feasible way to engage a particular country.  Nonetheless, methods 
that emphasize a more persistent approach should be explored.  Outside of the missions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the SFG(A)s already persistently engage in several other regions 
of the world, most notably in the Philippines and Columbia.  In these countries, 1st 
SFG(A) and 7th SFG(A), respectively, have maintained a persistent presence for years 
while also deploying forces to the CENTCOM AOR.  As a result, these SFG(A)s came to 
develop regional proficiency despite the demands of the last decade.  In addition to these 
large commitments, Special Forces also maintains smaller elements in numerous 
countries worldwide.  This small number of Special Forces Soldiers serve in a variety of 
functions.  An example would be the Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLO), but 
there are numerous other individual or pair assignments all over the world.292   
To increase regional proficiency in the Regiment, opportunities like these 
should be expanded.  As mentioned in the literature review, several people have already 
written about the value of persistent presence and have proposed ways to accomplish this 
(more forward deployed units, the Volkmann Program, more country team positions, 
etc.).  In addition, Special Forces could improve its persistent presence approach with 
three additional methods: country team augmenters, mini-JCETs, and foreign instructors.   
                                                 
291 Michael Vickers, statement to the House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, 
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, Assessing U.S. Special Operations 
Command’s Missions and Roles, 29 June 2006, accessed 18 November 2011, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/soc.pdf. 
292 Olson, 2011 SOCOM Posture Statement, 16. 
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(1) Country Team Augmenter.  Special Forces Soldiers already 
work closely with several country teams in specialized roles.  Unlike these individuals, 
the country team augmenter would be in-country to develop regional proficiency.  He 
could be attached to either the Defense Attaché (DATT) office or the Office of Defense 
Coordination (ODC).  He would serve a military purpose by being the SFG(A)’s 
representative for coordinating future engagement events.  In other words, he could 
provide short term help, which would make him interchangeable and allow a constant 
rotation of new soldiers into the country.  This flow would enable a Special Forces unit to 
provide several Soldiers with regional experience.  In addition to improving his regional 
proficiency, the augmenter could develop relationships with the host nation military and 
gain valuable experience in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational 
(JIIM) environment.   
(2) Mini-JCET.  Typically, a JCET consists of an SFODA 
conducting short, but intense training with a partner nation force.  A mini-JCET would 
take the opposite approach and would be a long term training event (about three months) 
done at a more measured pace and involving only a fraction of an SFODA (two to four 
personnel).  The longer and more deliberate pace would allow the SFODA members to 
conduct more specialized and in-depth training on a specific task.  For example, two 
Special Forces medics would be able to train a cohort of partner nation medics to a much 
higher standard over the course of three months than they would if they were providing 
medical training as part of a much shorter JCET that had several other training objectives.  
The extended length of time would facilitate cultural immersion and would facilitate the 
development of regional proficiency by the SFODA members.  Additionally, the 
element’s small size would obviate the negative effects that the longer deployment time 
would have with regard to unit OPTEMPO.  Potential disadvantages are that two to four 
Special Forces Soldiers cannot provide the same level of security, communication, and 
resources that is inherent to a whole SFODA and mini-JCETs would therefore not be 
appropriate for some regions.  Despite this, the mini-JCET would surely be appropriate 
for permissive environments.   
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(3) Foreign Instructor.  The most comprehensive approach to 
developing regional proficiency would be a Special Forces Soldier making a permanent 
change of station (PCS) move to the country and live there for one to three years to serve 
as a guest instructor at one of the host nation’s military schools.  The precedent for this 
already exists.  As highlighted by COL Owens in his SRP, Special Forces Soldiers from 
7
th
 SFG(A) have attended and served as instructors in the Columbian Lancero Course. 
Beyond the enhanced regional proficiency an individual would gain by serving as an 
instructor, the relationships that he would develop through this partnership would greatly 
strengthen the ties between the two militaries.293 
c. Immersion 
Groups need to immerse their Soldiers within their AORs. Some Groups 
do this well, others not so much. This cultural immersion not only 
provides the Soldier better language ability and cultural knowledge, but 
provides the Group with experts in various countries for which it is 
responsible. These Soldiers would be [go-to] guys for future operations in 
the countries for which they were immersed and that knowledge would be 
retained at Group. This immersion needs to go beyond just having a small 
team work out of the embassy, but live with families throughout the 
country, extensive travel throughout the country, etc. These immersion 
events need to vary in length due to the high demand for SF teams to 
conduct operations throughout the world, however, should be no less than 
one month IOT allow Soldiers to listen to the language, conduct 
travel/recon etc. 
—Special Forces Soldier294 
Immersion is the third method by which Special Forces Soldiers might 
improve their regional proficiency.  Immersion is separate from persistent engagement in 
that the Special Forces Soldiers’ primary purpose would be to live within the other 
culture.  The three methods by which immersion could be accomplished are live 
environment training (LET), the military personnel exchange program (MPEP), and 
intercultural exchange program. 
                                                 
293 Owens “Improving Cultural Education of Special Operations Forces,” 17. 
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(1) Live Environment Training (LET).  LET is a training program 
that already exists within USSOCOM.  Its guidelines are outlined in USSOCOM Manual 
350-8, SOF Language Program. 295  The primary purpose of LET events is to improve 
language skills through immersing the student in an area where the targeted language is 
spoken.  While language-centric, LET guidelines could easily be modified to include the 
improvement of regional proficiency as well.  
(2) Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP).  MPEP is an 
existing program, which allows for the one-for-one exchange of personnel between the 
U.S. Army and a partnered nation.  MPEP objectives are to enhance alliances, build 
partner capacity, increase cooperation and prepare officers and NCOs for future 
multinational assignments.296  Under the one-for-one exchange, a Special Force Soldier 
PCSs to a partner nation and works with its SOF, while his counterpart does the same in 
the United States.  Not only does the Special Forces Soldier develop a high level of 
regional proficiency and relationships that will serve him throughout his career, but his 
foreign counterpart is able to do the same in the U.S.  The benefits go well beyond the 
two individuals involved and would significantly strengthen the ties between both 
militaries.   
(3) Intercultural Exchange Program.   Depending on the country 
and the level of commitment that is sought, MPEP may not be the correct answer.  An 
intercultural exchange program offers a less intense version.  Like a militarized student 
exchange program, agreements could be reached with various countries to host Special 
Forces Soldiers in exchange for our hosting their own soldiers.  To keep costs down, 
soldiers could be garrisoned at military installations, using existing agreements.  This 
would differ from the MPEP in that the exchange soldiers would not be fulfilling a role in 
the partner military.  This could offer greater flexibility and lessen commitment 
requirements.   
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d. Strategic Studies Detachment 
The Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) is a potential enabler for 
leveraging Special Forces’ experiences.  Currently, each regional Military Information 
Support Operations Battalion has an SSD attached. An SSD consists of “Army civilian 
[MISO] analysts who provide area expertise, linguistic skills, and an organic social 
research capability to the regional [battalion].”297  In addition, SSDs are responsible for 
conducting thorough and timely research and analysis of targeted regions.298  The 
existing SSDs could be expanded and moved to USASOC to support Special Forces 
Groups in numerous ways.  First, SSDs would serve as resident subject matter experts 
(SME).  As organic SMEs, SSDs could provide detailed briefings to deploying SFODAs.  
SSDs would offer continuity to the SFG(A)s.  Beyond providing research and analysis, 
they would be the organization’s long-term memory about region-specific engagements.  
By serving as the clearinghouse for deployment reports, their historical knowledge would 
allow them to identify research gaps in an SFG(A)’s AOR.  They could then suggest 
specific topics that deploying SFODAs could focus on during their deployments.  This 
clearinghouse role would help reinvigorate the use of SODARS and area assessments and 
ensure that quality reports about an AOR are produced.  By being the keepers of the 
knowledge, SSDs would be ideally positioned to pass along hard won lessons learned to 
new Special Forces members.   
2. Training 
a. Intermediate Regional Studies (IRS) 
As previously mentioned, SWCS already developed the Intermediate 
Regional Studies (IRS) course to help address deficiencies in regional proficiency 
education.  This course is being refined and should be sustained.  Currently most of the 
students are recent SFQC graduates who have not yet conducted permanent change of 
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station (PCS) moves to their SFG(A)s.  They are generally in the top 15% of their 
graduating SFQC class.  The focus on recent graduates makes sense given the length of 
the IRS course (5.5 weeks) and the mandate from SOCOM to frontload cultural training 
in initial acquisition training.  Even better would be if the entire Special Forces Regiment 
were afforded the opportunity to increase regional proficiency through this training.  The 
IRS should be expanded to accommodate more students, and opportunities should be 
made available for veteran Special Forces Soldiers to participate.  At the cost of 
increasing time away from the SFG(A)s, IRS could be incorporated into SLC.   
b. Advanced Regional Analysis Course (ARAC) 
SWCS once offered a regional analysis course that was available to MISO, 
CA and SF Soldiers.  This course was eliminated in the early 2000s as part of an 
efficiency initiative.  DRSE contemplated re-introducing a revamped course in 2010, but 
could not due to a lack of funding and manpower.  The stated goals of the proposed 
course included: demonstrating country and regional knowledge, analyzing regional 
events and issues, applying cultural awareness, and presenting analysis in oral and written 
form.  The proposed course was to be 12-weeks long.  This course was designed to be 
academically rigorous and prerequisites for admission include holding the rank of 
Sergeant First Class or above, one year within USASOC and a bachelor’s degree.  
Reviving this course would be ideal for creating RP 3-qualified soldiers.299  The 
precedent for this type of course in SWCS exists already.  Finding additional funds and 
manpower is never easy, especially when SWCS is under constant pressure to produce 
more Soldiers faster.  But if the importance of regional proficiency in irregular warfare is 
to be taken seriously, SWCS should find the resources to reintroduce this course and 
USASFC(A) should motivate Soldiers to attend.   
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c. Professional Military Education (PME) 
(1) Online Regional, Cultural, Language, Familiarization Program.  
The Marine Corps RCLF Program represents a fully developed online regional 
proficiency program.  Its goals are modest and reasonable.  Special Forces could adopt 
the Marine Corps RCLF Program and incorporate it into the PME system.  Similar to 
what the Marine Corps is contemplating, completion of certain blocks could be 
mandatory requirements at certain stages of a Special Forces NCO career.  Since Special 
Forces Soldiers are regional professionals and the RCLF Program was designed for 
general purpose Marines, a realignment of the blocks of instructions would be in order.  
For example, junior NCOs (E6-E7) could be expected to complete the Marine Corps 
NCO blocks and senior NCOs (E8-E9) could be expected to complete the Marine Corps 
officer blocks. The RCLF Program will not produce an RP 3-qualified soldier, but will 
ensure that there is a baseline level of regional knowledge within the Special Forces 
Regiment.  This program already exists and is easily delivered without undue stress to the 
system.   
(2)  Foreign Professional Military Education (FPME).  As 
mentioned earlier, exchange programs with foreign militaries offer excellent 
opportunities for developing regional proficiency.  The value of attending a FPME, which 
develops regional proficiency and regionally-focused relationships, is widely 
acknowledged.  ADM McRaven stressed the importance of FPME at his congressional 
confirmation hearing as USSOCOM Commander.300  Currently, FPME is targeted for 
mid and senior grade officers.  Few militaries have NCO development systems equivalent 
to the United States.  For those countries that do, exchanges could prove beneficial not 
only for developing regional proficiency, but for creating enduring partner relations.  
Currently, the United States hosts numerous foreign officers who attend the officer basic 
courses, yet the U.S. does not send new lieutenants to foreign basic courses.  A Special 
Forces NCO is expected to “organize, train, assist, direct, or lead indigenous forces up to 
company size.”301  Why couldn’t a Special Forces NCO attend a foreign officer basic 
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course?  Doing so would provide an SF NCO several benefits to include: regional 
proficiency, relationships with foreign partners, and increased understanding of a foreign 
military.  Sending an NCO to a foreign officer school is a delicate issue, however, since 
most militaries are rank conscious.  At the very least, the potential benefits from FPME 
warrant investigating whether an NCO-level FPME is possible in any of the countries 
deemed important by GCCs. 
3. Education 
a. Regional Studies Bachelor’s Degree 
SWCS is already aggressively pursuing an education initiative.  SWCS’ 
goal is to provide every Special Forces Soldier the opportunity to complete their 
bachelor’s degree at approximately the same time he completes his Senior Leader’s 
Course.302  NCOs with the rank of Sergeant First Class generally attend the Senior 
Leader’s Course as part of the NCO Education System (NCOES).  Several institutions of 
higher learning have already partnered with SWCS and SWCS is constantly expanding its 
partnerships.  This education initiative could be dovetailed into increasing regional 
proficiency.  Most Special Forces Soldiers are already interested in higher education.  If 
partnered institutions offered applicable regional studies curriculums, it would be 
possible for a Special Forces Soldier to improve himself professionally while achieving a 
personal goal.   
To achieve this synergy, the Special Forces Soldier would have to be 
personally motivated to choose a relevant regional studies curriculum over whatever 
academic interests he might have.  Because SWCS degree program is based on tuition 
assistance, the choice in degree will always remain with the soldier.  Despite this, 
academic credit for military training would certainly help make the regional studies 
degree attractive.  Area studies could easily turn into academic papers.  An unclassified 
military task, such as determining the social structure of a Tuareg tribe in North Africa, 
could easily become a Special Forces Soldier’s term paper for a sociology or history 
                                                 
302 Walton, “SWCS Education Program.”  
 112 
class.  The overlapping benefits would be significant.  For instance, a military report 
would likely become more extensive and detailed if it was going to be converted into “for 
credit” paper.  Faculty should gain something from this in turn, since Special Forces 
Soldiers spend time in far flung places of the world where most academics are either 
unwilling or unable to go.  By encouraging this intersection between military 
training/tasks and academic credit, regional studies could become the favored curriculum 
among Special Forces Soldiers.  Regional studies would be even more enticing with the 
introduction of unit-level regionally focused short courses. 
b. Regionally Focused Short Courses 
Receiving academic classes from civilian subject matter experts is hardly a 
new concept in the DoD.  The Marine Corps sends Marines to San Diego State University 
and Coastal Carolina Community College for language classes.303  With this precedent, it 
would be but a small leap for Special Forces Soldiers to receive regional proficiency 
training at local or online colleges.  If institutions of higher education, either near the 
homes of the SFG(A)s or online, offered regional studies courses for the applicable 
AORs, a program similar to the USMC precedent might be implemented.  Beyond 
language training, the best example of leveraging academia to improve cultural capability 
is the Navy’s Regional Studies Education Program (RSEP).  Under the RSEP, civilian 
academics provide units with tailored education about regions of interest.  Special Forces 
could leverage this unique resource through either JSOU or SWCS.  Special Forces units 
with long term interests in a specific region could commission leading academics on this 
area to provide an academic short course to its personnel.  This would provide quality 
academic instruction to Special Forces Soldiers on their specific region and make them 
more proficient at their tasks.  Additionally, if certified short courses were accepted by a 
partnered institution, the synergy mentioned in the previous section would be capitalized 
on and Special Forces Soldiers would be that much closer to earning their degrees while 
becoming better at their jobs.   
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C. WAYS – HOW TO DO IT 
1. Command Climate 
It has been my experience that leaders verbally emphasize AOR 
knowledge, but do not allow time, resources, or opportunity to conduct the 
training. 
–Special Forces Soldier304 
Fortunately, the most important tool for improving regional proficiency within 
Special Forces is neither labor nor resource intensive.  Improving regional proficiency 
begins with the command climate within Special Forces.  As indicated in the survey 
analysis, most people in Special Forces (commanders and Soldiers alike) feel that 
regional proficiency is important.  Unfortunately, because regional proficiency is such an 
intangible, it is often relegated to the figurative back burner with the idea that it will 
somehow be acquired along the way.   
Commanders and what they value have significant impact on the behavior of their 
units.  A common comment made by Special Forces Soldiers during the research phase of 
this thesis was that the only time their commander expressed interest in cultural 
capability in his unit was when someone was delinquent on his Defense Language 
Proficiency Test (DLPT).  The extent of the concern was merely the issue of staying 
current, not improvement, sustainment or even qualification (ILR 1/1).305   Soldiers’ 
perspective often is, “If the commander doesn’t care, why should I?”  Commanders can 
help improve regional proficiency within their units by providing a purpose and clear 
direction with regard to regional proficiency.   
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a. Purpose 
Purpose gives subordinates the reason to act in order to 
achieve a desired outcome. Leaders should provide clear purpose for 
their followers and do that in a variety of ways. 
- FM 6-22, Army Leadership306 
Commanders can provide purpose to Special Forces Soldiers by highlighting the 
importance of regional proficiency for irregular warfare (IW).  Special Forces Soldiers 
should understand why it makes sense to devote so much of their time to understanding a 
particular region in the world.  The Special Forces Soldier is a professional; 
accomplishing the mission is the primary motivator.  If Special Forces Soldiers 
understand that they are expected to learn about the region, they will accomplish the 
mission and probably exceed expectations.  It is the commander’s responsibility to 
explain the reason for regional proficiency to his Special Forces Soldiers.    
b. Clear Direction 
Providing clear direction involves communicating how to 
accomplish a mission: prioritizing tasks, assigning responsibility for 
completion, and ensuring subordinates understand the standard. 
—FM 6-22, Army Leadership307 
Tied directly into providing a purpose is providing clear direction.  Commanders 
set priorities.  Special Forces Soldiers and units are expected to do an enormous amount 
in a finite period of time.  In addition, as discussed in Chapter III, Special Forces doctrine 
pulls in two directions.  A common comment in the survey was that Special Forces 
Soldiers would improve their regional proficiency if given enough time.308  To quote a 
respondent, “There is a finite amount of time right now and no incentive can trump a 
command’s focus on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.”309  Unfortunately, tasks in the 
military tend to have the same properties as gas; they will expand to fill the volume of the 
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container.  Simply finding more time is not the answer.  Commanders need to set 
priorities and determine where regional proficiency is on their priority list.  A SWCS 
instructor highlighted the importance of priorities this way: “Every day, I am expected to 
do a hundred different things.  I do the twenty that are reported to the commander.”   
In addition to priorities, commanders need to assign responsibility for developing 
regional proficiency.  While regional proficiency is an individual skill, commanders can 
hold subordinates accountable for the development of regional proficiency within their 
units.  Strong evaluation reports require quantifiable data.  If RPs were implemented, 
commanders could use them as a measurement of excellence within a unit.  For example, 
an increased number of RPs or an improvement in an RP could justify an excellence 
block on a non-commissioned officer evaluation report (NCOER) or a supporting 
sentence to justify an above center of mass mark for an officer evaluation report (OER).   
Clear direction also means ensuring that subordinates understand the standard.  
One standard was offered in the ends section of this chapter.  Another would be the 
standard that commanders set for reports such as SODARS and area assessments.  
Increased visibility by commanders on reports would ensure that SFODAs consistently 
produce high quality reports.  As explained in Chapter III, quality reports help promote 
regional proficiency within SFODAs.   
2. Personnel Policies 
One hopes, we would no longer see even the smallest military assistance 
groups shared out between the different Services and we would no longer 
see the constant renewal of inexperience by the senseless enforcement of 
the principle of rotation even in cases where unique expertise vital for 
continuity is thereby dissipated. 
–Eddward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare” 310 
Army personnel policies are a major hindrance to developing regional proficiency 
in Special Forces.  Although Special Forces are expected to be specialized and perform a 
unique function within the Army, Special Forces are still beholden to policies designed 
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for the general purpose force.  To be competitive for promotion, Special Forces Soldiers 
are encouraged to hold several positions that are considered valuable in producing a 
“well-rounded” Soldier.  If a Special Forces Soldier assumes a “non-standard” career 
track, he risks adversely affecting his promotion potential.311  To quote a survey 
respondent, “The difficulty with incentivizing regionally-oriented language and cultural 
skills is that these capabilities are not valued by our parent organizations… Assignments 
which develop these skills are career-killers.”312  This inadvertent discouragement of 
“non-standard” careers hampers the development of regional proficiency.  Many of the 
items mentioned in the ends section of this thesis require long-term commitments and 
divergence from the “non-standard” career track.  Currently, there is potential that a 
Special Forces Soldier who volunteered to devote several years to living in another 
country and who specialized in one region would not be as competitive as his peer who 
moved every three years and held a variety of positions to become “well rounded.”   
The adverse effect of general purpose force personnel policy on SOF is not new. 
For several years ADM Olson addressed the issue with the Services and DoD.313  To 
improve the situation, DODD 5100.01, “Functions of the Department of Defense and Its 
Major Components” was modified to require Military Services to coordinate with 
USSOCOM on personnel management policy.314   In his congressional testimony, ADM 
McRaven was optimistic that this modification would provide enough influence to allow 
USSOCOM to properly develop and train SOF personnel.315  As mentioned in Chapter I, 
regional expertise is expensive and requires a long term commitment.  Additionally, as 
mentioned in Chapter II, regional proficiency is acknowledged DoD-wide to be an 
important capability to meet future irregular warfare threats.  In a Congressional hearing 
on institutionalizing irregular warfare, Congressman Mac Thornberry expressed concern 
that while irregular warfare had been captured in doctrine, the organizational culture, 
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expressed in “promotions and dollars spent,” might not have changed, and was still 
resistant to irregular warfare.  MG Bayer, the Army representative, responded that the 
Army culture had indeed changed, and that the Army expects more irregular warfare and 
that the Army is changing to meet these challenges.  Paraphrasing others, MG Bayer said, 
“If we are the same Army ten years from now that we are today, then we have not learned 
a thing and shame on us.”316  Ideally, the Army will now, in fact, fully support personnel 
policies that promote Special Forces development of regional proficiency.   
3. Motivation 
Motivation supplies the will to do what is necessary to accomplish a 
mission. Motivation comes from within, but is affected by others’ actions 
and words. A leader’s role in motivation is to understand the needs and 
desires of others, to align and elevate individual drives into team goals, 
and to influence others and accomplish those larger aims.  
–FM 6-22, Army Leadership317 
Since regional proficiency is an individual skill that requires personal interest and 
commitment, properly motivating Special Forces Soldiers to improve their regional 
proficiency is critical.  Currently, several Special Forces Soldiers do feel incentivized to 
develop regional proficiency.  To quote one survey respondent: 
There is currently no incentive for soldiers to be more culturally aware 
than their peers. It takes time to study countries and to become a SME. It 
largely comes down to professional pride and other unit priorities force 
language and AOR study to occur "after-hours." If soldiers have a choice 
between spending time with families or AOR study, most will choose their 
families, especially with the high OPTEMPO. Language training is an 
afterthought and soldiers are not deployed to locations where they have 
the best cultural and language capabilities. They are sent largely based on 
manpower needs and personal reputation as opposed to verified skills and 
ability. 318  
The survey asked the participants to rank several incentive methods: sense of 
professionalism, recognition, promotion, incentive pay, college credit, SFODA time, and 
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time in AOR.  This list is not exhaustive, but does represent some of the trends 
discovered during research for this thesis.  As suggested by the LCNA project, an 
approach that melds multiple incentives would be the most effective.  
a. Sense of Professionalism 
It is my professional responsibility to prepare myself for deployments to 
my assigned AOR and my Unit’s responsibility to ensure I do. 
–Special Forces Soldier319 
A Special Forces NCO is a professional.  This sense of professionalism is 
perhaps the most powerful motivator in the incentive structure.  As mentioned in Chapter 
IV, LCNA’s research found that non-monetary incentives were more influential than 
monetary incentives for language proficiency.  Of the five non-monetary incentives it 
cites, three can be attributed to a sense of professionalism: saving lives/force protection, 
mission success, supporting the team.  The sense of professionalism also loomed large in 
my results.  The vast majority of respondents replied that they did not need an incentive 
to improve their regional proficiency because they considered it a professional 
responsibility.   
Properly applied, this sense of professionalism could help increase 
regional proficiency in Special Forces.  If leaders made it clear to their subordinates that 
regional proficiency is considered a key attribute of a professional Special Forces Soldier 
and directly affects mission success, most Special Forces Soldiers would rise to the 
challenge.  Special Forces Soldiers would endeavor to improve their regional proficiency 
if they knew this was what was expected of them.   
However, as one critic of the survey noted, relying on a sense of 
professionalism is “a[n] illegitimate option for any competent leader as it puts the entire 
responsibility at the Soldier level.”320  In his view, the unit and commander’s should be 
more proactive in developing their Soldiers. 
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b. Recognition 
I believe that all SF [S]oldiers given an incentive, based on challenges that 
drive the pursuit of professional development, will produce the best 
product for the [R]egiment.  There is something to be said for a tangible 
product for a [S]oldier to be proud of… 
–Special Forces Soldier321 
The survey analysis indicates that recognition plays a minor role in 
motivating a Special Forces Soldier to improve his regional proficiency.  The concept of 
recognition was presented in the form of a Professional Development Skill Identifier 
(PDSI), which is used to represent special skills in the personnel system.  Despite its 
relatively low level of influence, recognizing excellence is a basic principle of leadership.  
The concept is again closely tied to the command climate.  Recognition is a public 
demonstration of what the unit values.  Recognizing excellence in regional proficiency, 
either through awarding a PDSI or via simple public acknowledgement, conveys to the 
Soldiers of the unit that regional proficiency is important.    
c. Promotion 
Numerous survey respondents indicated that they did not join Special 
Forces to be promoted and that a promotion incentive would have no effect on them.  
However, others did indicate that promotion opportunities could be an incentive.  A 
promotion incentive for regional proficiency would be incorporated in much the same 
manner as other special skills.  There are several skills and qualifications that indicate 
that a Special Forces Soldier has excelled in a certain aspect of his profession.  While 
viewed favorably, none of these special skills guarantees promotion.  They are only one 
of many factors considered by a promotion board.  For this reason, it would make sense 
to treat regional proficiency similarly, which it would have to be if it was considered by 
promotion boards to be a hallmark of excellence in the profession.   
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d. Incentive Pay 
As discussed in Chapter IV, monetary incentives play a role in language 
proficiency.  Monetary incentives could play the same role with regard to regional 
proficiency.  If Special Forces Soldiers could receive incentive pay for the higher RPs, 
they would be more inclined to devote his energies to improving or maintaining his RP.    
Qualifying on an annual test is required to receive the foreign language proficiency 
bonus.  The RPAT will also factor in time.  A person’s RP will degrade the longer he is 
away from the region.  Incentive pay would help incentivize Special Forces Soldiers to 
find deployments to the region to maintain or improve their RP. 
e. College Credit 
Most Special Forces Soldiers want to earn their bachelor’s degree.  As 
discussed earlier, providing opportunities to improve one’s regional proficiency while 
also earning academic credit would represent a win-win.   
f. SFODA Time 
More ODA time could be used to motivate me to do just 
about anything. 
-Special Forces Soldier322 
Special Forces Soldiers join Special Forces to serve on an SFODA.  
SFODA time is one of the most prized duties within Special Forces.  As indicated by the 
survey analysis, additional SFODA time would play a major role in motivating Special 
Forces Soldiers to improve their regional proficiency.  Managing manning requirements 
is a difficult task in any organization.  Given its large size, varied requirements, and 
varied commitments, Special Forces is an organization that makes managing manning 
requirements a very complicated affair.  Despite these challenges, one item in Special 
Forces’ favor is that the vast majority of Special Forces billets fall within USASOC.  This 
grants USASOC considerable control in forming Special Forces-specific manning 
policies.  Clearly, using extra SFODA time as an incentive would have to be done 
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judiciously to avoid detrimental ripple effects in the personnel system.  One potential 
incentive would be to promise a Special Forces Soldier an extra year on a team if he 
achieved a certain RP by a specific time.  A variation on this would be conferring a 
protected status on SFODA members who are RP 3 qualified.  Special Forces Groups are 
tasked each year to provide a certain number of Special Forces Soldiers to fill manning 
requirements (e.g., SWCS instructor, etc.) outside of the SFG(A).  The pool from which 
leaders consider whom to send typically include SFODA members who have been on a 
SFODA for more than three years.  If an RP 3 qualification made a Special Forces 
Soldier exempt from that consideration for another year, most Special Forces Soldiers 
would attempt to earn the RP 3 qualification.   
g. Time in AOR 
If the ODA/AOB’s competency level was taken into account when being 
assigned missions by the Group, I feel the ODA/AOB would work harder 
to better understand the language/culture. 
—Special Forces Soldier323 
Most Special Forces Soldiers joined Special Forces to deploy to and work 
in foreign lands.  Deploying is considered a rewarding experience.  This desire to spend 
time in the AOR should be used as an incentive to develop regional proficiency.  If a 
person’s regional proficiency made him more likely to deploy to his AOR, either as part 
of a SFODA or as part of one of the programs discussed earlier in this chapter, a positive 
feedback loop could be created.  A high RP would result in more deployments to the 
AOR, which would result in a higher RP, which would result in still more deployments.  
The effectiveness of this incentive would depend on how it is implemented.  While most 
Special Forces Soldiers enjoy deploying, Special Forces Soldiers get burned out and 
desire time with their families just like any other Soldier.  Opportunities do exist for a 
Soldier to PCS with his family to his AOR, but these are limited to only certain AORs 
and countries.  To quote a survey respondent, “If I was not married with children, I would 
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very much want to live in many places overseas. Unfortunately, there are few places I 
would want my children living other than the US.”324   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. KEEPING SPECIAL FORCES SPECIAL 
Who am I? Why am I here? 
–VADM(ret.) James Stockdale325 
 
Conventional forces are looking more like SOF.  SOF are looking more 
like conventional forces.  There needs to be a conversation about what 
makes SOF SOF. 326  




What we have recognized, really, is that the general purpose forces can do 
some of the mission sets that are commonly associated with irregular 
warfare and it’s not the exclusive domain of special operations forces… 
We have general purpose forces that can actually do counterterrorism 
missions in a counterinsurgency environment.  So part of it is we have to 
blend those forces together in terms of mission profiles… The other thing 
I think as we look forward to Phase 0 activities (Prevent), it’s being able to 
commit to the combatant commanders forces, general purpose forces, to 
augment the Special Operations Forces that have very finite levels of 
language, cultural, advise and assist-type capabilities, but to take some of 
the burden off the development of security capacity and use general 
purpose forces to do security force assistance… basic skill transference 
101 and our regionally aligned brigade concept… is aimed at trying to do 
that.327 
–MG Peter Bayer  
Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy 
3 November 2011 
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Germany, 2009. 
327 Bayer, Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capability. 
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DoD recognizes that irregular warfare will continue to play a major role going 
forward.  Those who understand irregular warfare understand that regional proficiency is 
critical to the successful prosecution of this type of warfare.  Across DoD, units are 
changing to meet the challenges irregular warfare poses.   
MG Bayer notes in his epigraph above, general purpose forces are adapting to the 
new security environment.  Thanks to the last decade of conflict, GPF have become more 
precise and more lethal.  Engaging with the population is now considered a fundamental 
part of the mission and a GPF commander would be considered negligent if he did not 
attempt to work with the population.  With looming budget cuts and with the drawdown 
of forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, GPF will look to apply their hard won experience and 
will continue to attempt to assume some of the responsibilities customarily associated 
with Special Forces.  There probably are some situations that only require “basic skill 
transference 101.”  For instance, Army NCOs, regardless of MOS, are some of the best 
trainers in the world.  An infantry platoon with interpreters could teach a foreign military 
basic rifle marksmanship.  If that is the only goal of the engagement and it is cost-
effective, it might make sense to commit an infantry platoon to the mission in lieu of a 
SFODA.   
On the other hand, if the engagement with another country has multiple 
objectives, one might reconsider the choice.  If, besides basic rifle marksmanship, the 
purpose of the engagement is to have a small specialized cohort of regional experts who 
were selected and trained for their cultural capability deploying to the country to improve 
their knowledge of the region, to foster and maintain personal relationships, and to 
practice their wartime mission of working with foreign forces, then the standard infantry 
platoon might not be the best choice for the mission.  Special Forces would be more 
suitable.  This leads to the question raised by ADM Olson in the epigraph above: what 
makes Special Forces special?  Special Forces are elite and they do have significant direct 
action capabilities.  But so do SEALs, MARSOC and the Ranger Regiment.  Also, as 
suggested by MG Bayer, the direct skills capabilities divide between SOF and GPF is 
shrinking.  So, what does make Special Forces special?   
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One argument this thesis has made is that Special Forces’ unique blend of skills in 
conjunction with regional proficiency makes Special Forces the preeminent irregular 
warfare force.  Other units in DoD may attempt to adapt and develop irregular warfare 
capabilities, but irregular warfare is Special Forces’ raison d’etre.  In this time of 
dwindling resources and increasing competition, what Special Forces needs to do is 
concentrate on strengthening its core characteristics.  For this reason, among many, 
regional proficiency should not be left to chance.  A deliberate regional proficiency 
strategy should be adopted to ensure that the Special Forces Regiment is prepared to meet 
any future contingency.  Only by refocusing on its core values, will Special Forces be 
better prepared to meet the future challenges of irregular warfare than any other force –
friend or foe.  
When determining the importance of regional proficiency and one’s strategic 
value, a Special Forces Soldier should contemplate the philosophical line immortalized 
by ADM(ret.) Stockdale, “Who am I?  Why am I here?” 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Both Special Forces and regional proficiency are complicated topics.  Combining 
the two into a research project created a very intricate problem.  The pursuit of an answer 
to one question often raised two more questions.  Thankfully, this thesis had a deadline 
which rescued the author from several rabbit holes.  There were several paths not taken 
and several research lessons learned that might be useful for follow-on researchers.     
The first path not taken has to do with the command environment for regional 
proficiency.  The command environment is a significant factor in influencing regional 
proficiency interest in Special Forces.  This begs the question of what constitutes a 
command environment that is conducive to developing regional proficiency.  Further 
research into this area is warranted.  Determining what is the right mix of direct and 
indirect skills for Special Forces would be beneficial.  Additionally, analyzing current 
attitudes toward direct and indirect skills could be revealing.  Unfortunately, this was 
beyond the scope of this thesis.   
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Another question that deserves consideration is: what is a region?  How big or 
small should the region be to be useful?  Numerous organizations in DoD have wrestled 
with this question and each has come up with a different answer.  It would be worthwhile 
to determine what the optimal regional breakdown is for DoD.     
The next item worth further study is a follow-up on trends exposed during the 
survey.  The most striking revelation from the survey was the distinctiveness of each 
Special Forces Group.  Further analysis of the characteristics of each Special Forces 
Group and the reasons for this would doubtless be revealing.  Another topic that the 
survey probed, but that was not analyzed was the influence that an individual’s baseline 
interests have on forming his interest in direct and indirect skills.  Finally, deserving 
further attention is a comparison of external versus internal perceptions of the purpose of 
Special Forces.  While my survey did gather a lot of information, it could be improved 
upon which leads me to my lessons learned.   
I designed the survey to be concise.  Being concise, it was also direct.  The survey 
was titled a “regional proficiency survey” and on page seven was a series of questions 
that dealt with regional proficiency (see Figure 32).  Because it was presented as a 
regional proficiency survey, people might have opted not to take it which would have 
skewed results.  Also, with several regional proficiency questions appearing in a row, 
respondents might have unconsciously altered their answers, or to use a courtroom drama 
term, the line of questioning could have “led the witness.”  It would probably be better to 
mask the intent of the survey and add several more innocuous questions and terms.  
Finally, the delivery of the survey proved problematic.  The survey was created through 
the online service Survey Monkey and delivered by email.  This link was sometimes not 
compatible with some filters used by DoD and a portion of the survey population was not 
able to open it on a government computer and as a result the opportunity to receive their 






Within the Department of Defense, different organizations categorize the world in 
different ways.  The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) do not align with the 
Army FAO regions, which do not align with the Marine Corps RCLF regions, which do 
not align with DoD RP regions.  For reference throughout this thesis, the DoD RP regions 
are listed below.     
Table 4.   Regional Proficiency Geographic Area328 
 
North America 
Canada Greenland USA   
Central America 
Belize Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
Mexico Nicaragua Panama   
South America 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Ecuador Falkland 
Islands 
French Guinea Guyana Paraguay 
Peru Suriname Uruguay Venezuela  
Caribbean 
Anguilla Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Aruba Bahamas Barbados 
Bermuda Cayman Islands Cuba Dominica Dominican 
Republic 
Grenada Guadeloupe Haiti Jamaica Martinique 
Montserrat Netherlands 
Antilles 
Puerto Rico Saint Kitts & 
Nevis 
Saint Lucia 













    
Western Europe 
Andorra Austria Belgium Croatia Cyprus 
                                                 
328 Common Human Resources Information Standard, “Person Regional Experience Geographic Area 
/ Country Tabular Business Rule,” accessed 30 November 2011, 
http://www.prim.osd.mil/Documents/TBRs/Person_Regional_Experience_TBR.pdf. 
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Denmark Estonia Faeroe Islands Finland France 
Germany Gibraltar Greece Guernsey Holy See 
(Vatican City 
State) 
Iceland Ireland Isle of Man Italy Jersey 
Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta 
Monaco Netherlands Norway Portugal San Marino 
Slovenia Spain  Sweden Switzerland Turkey 
United 
Kingdom 
    
Eastern Europe 
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 










Slovakia Ukraine    
South Asia 
Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India  Maldives 








Philippines Singapore Thailand Timor-Leste Viet Nam 
East Asia 
China Japan Mongolia North Korea South Korea 
Central Asia 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Middle East / North Africa (MENA) 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 
Iraq 
Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Tunisia United Arab 
Emirates 




Benin Burkina Faso Cape Verde Cote d’Ivoire Gambia 
Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Mali 
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Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone 
Togo Western Sahara    
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola Botswana Burundi Cameroon Central African 
Republic 
Chad Comoro Congo Congo, 
Democratic 




Eritrea Ethiopa Gabon Kenya 
Lesotho Madagascar Malawi Mauritius Mayotte 
Mozambique Namibia Reunion Rwanda Saint Helena 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 




Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 
Western Oceania 












Nauru New Caledonia 
Niue Northern 
Mariana Islands 





Tokelau Tonga Tuvalu 
Vanuatu Wallis & 
Futuna 
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APPENDIX B. 
A. THE SURVEY 
 Images of the survey used in this thesis research are included below.  To facilitate 
the discussion on the computation of the various values used in the survey analysis, 
questions have been labeled. 
  




Figure 28.   Survey Page 2 
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Figure 29.   Survey Page 3 
 
Figure 30.   Survey Page 4 
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Figure 31.   Survey Page 5 
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Figure 32.   Survey Page 6 
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Figure 33.   Survey Page 7 
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Figure 34.   Survey Page 8 
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Figure 35.   Survey Page 9 
 
Figure 36.   Survey Page 10 
 
Figure 37.   Survey Page 11 
B. VALUES 
1. Warrior-Diplomat Score 
The Warrior-Diplomat Score was calculated based upon the average between two 
values.  The first value was the average of the Special Forces Core Tasks that were 
categorized as indirect in Chapter III.  The second value was the value given for the 
“advise, train and assist foreign forces” question.   
 




2. Commando Score 
 The Commando Score was calculated based upon the average between two 
values.  The first value was the average of the Special Forces Core Tasks that were 
categorized as direct in Chapter III.  The second value was the value given for the “HVI” 





3. Regional Proficiency Interest 
 The Regional Proficiency Interest value was the average of the scores for “It is 
important to be knowledgeable about my AOR” and the “I would like to improve my 
knowledge of my AOR” questions. 
 
   
 
4. Command Environment Score 
 The Command Environment Score was the average of the responses pertaining to 




Commando Score ) 
Command Environment Score ) 
Regional Proficiency Interest ) 
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5. Regional Competence Utility 
 The Regional Competence Utility value was the average of the scores for “Area 
and Cultural Orientation” and the “knowledge of a region makes me more effective” 




6. 3C Utility 
 The 3C Utility value was the average of the scores for “Interpersonal Skills” and 
the “my effectiveness is not based upon a specific region” question.   
 
 
7. Language Utility 
 The Language Utility value was simply based upon the response for Language 
Proficiency.   
 
 
8. Value of Language Score 
The Value of Language Score was determined by categorizing the responses into 
seven categories and assigning values to each.  The premise was the language score, the 
higher the value.  The categorization is below: 






Regional Competence Utility ) 
3C Utility ) 





Table 5.   Value of Language Score Table 
 
9. Happiness with AOR 
 Happiness with AOR was determined by averaging the value given for 
“deploying to my AOR is a rewarding experience” and the value of “I would switch 
AORs” subtracted from 8.   
 
 
10. Experience in SF Value 
 The Experience in SF Value was determined by categorizing the responses into 8 
categories and assigning values to each.  The premise was the higher level of experience, 
the higher the value.  The categorization is below: 
Years have served in SF ≤1 0 
5≥Years have served in SF>1 1 
10≥Years have served in SF>5 2 
15≥Years have served in SF>10 3 
20≥Years have served in SF>15 4 
25≥Years have served in SF>20 5 
30≥Years have served in SF>25 6 
Years have served in SF >30 7 
Table 6.   Value of “Years have served in SF” Table 
Happiness With AOR ) 
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11. Rank Value 
 The Rank Value was determined by categorizing the responses into 8 categories 
and assigning values to each.  The ranks were categorized by what level of unit the rank 
typically served in.  The premise was the closer the rank was to serving on a SFODA, the 




Group Leader (CW5 and O6) 3 
Battalion Leader (CW4 and O5) 4 
Company Leader (E9, CW3, and O4) 5 
SFODA Leader (E8, WO1, CW2, and O3) 6 
SFODA Member (E5,E6,and E7) 7 
Table 7.   Rank Value Table 
 
 
12. Time In AOR Value 
 The Time In AOR Value was determined by first normalizing the time spent in 
AOR against the person’s time in SF.  This was done by calculating a ratio, dividing the 
Time In AOR, which was converted into years, by the person’s years in SF.  This ratio 
was then assigned a value.  The premise was that the higher the ratio, the higher the 
value.  The categorization is below:   
 
Time In AOR ratio ≤1 0 
.05≥Time In AOR ratio >.01 1 
.10≥ Time In AOR ratio >.05 2 
.15≥ Time In AOR ratio >.10 3 
.20≥ Time In AOR ratio >.15 4 
 143 
25≥ Time In AOR ratio >.20 5 
.30≥ Time In AOR ratio >.25 6 
>.30 7 
Table 8.   Time In AOR Value Table 
 
13. Time Outside AOR Value 
 The Time Outside AOR Value was determined by first normalizing the time spent 
in AOR against the person’s time in SF.  This was done by calculating a ratio, dividing 
the Time Outside AOR, which was converted into years, by the person’s years in SF.  
This ratio was then assigned a value.  The premise was that the higher the ratio, the 
higher the value.  The categorization is below:   
Time Outside AOR ratio ≤1 0 
.05≥Time Outside AOR ratio>.01 1 
.10≥ Time Outside AOR ratio >.05 2 
.15≥ Time Outside AOR ratio >.10 3 
.20≥ Time Outside AOR ratio >.15 4 
25≥ Time Outside AOR ratio >.20 5 
.30≥ Time Outside AOR ratio >.25 6 
Time Outside AOR ratio >.30 7 
 
Table 9.    Time Outside AOR Value Table 
14. Training Value 
The Training Value was determined by categorizing the responses for amount of 
weeks devoted to improving cultural capability into 8 categories and assigning values to 
each.  The premise was the higher amount of training time, the higher the value.  The 
categorization is below: 
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Weeks of Training = 0 0 
2≥ Weeks of Training >0 1 
4≥ Weeks of Training >2 2 
6≥ Weeks of Training >4 3 
8≥ Weeks of Training >6 4 
10≥ Weeks of Training >8 5 
12≥ Weeks of Training >10 6 
Weeks of Training >12 7 
Table 10.   Training Value 
 
C. ANALYSIS TABLES 
1. Reading the Tables 
When reading the tables below, it important to understand the meaning of the 
different values.  The first value is the R-square value, which is also called the coefficient 
of determination.  This value indicates the fit of the model used.  The scale is zero to one 
with one being a perfect fit and zero indicating no relation between the dependent 
variable and independent variables.  The relation between the variables is expressed in 
two ways: magnitude (or size) and reliability (or truthfulness).  Magnitude (i.e., coef) 
measures the amount that the independent variable affects the dependent variable.  
Reliability (i.e., R > t ) is the accuracy of the impact of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable.  The number represents the chance that the relation is a fluke, so the 
lower the number is the better.  As a general rule of thumb, when the p-value is .05 or 
lower, the result is statistically significant.329   
                                                 
329 Thomas Hill and Paul Lewicki, Statistics: Methods and Applications (Tulsa, OK: StatSoft, Inc., 
2006), accessed 30 November 2011,  http://statsoft.com/textbook/. 
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2. Regional Proficiency Interest 
Regional Proficiency Interest (Total SF) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 










Number of Observations: 495 R-Squared: .715 
 
Table 11.   Regional Proficiency Interest (Total SF) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (1
st
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 










Number of Observations: 84 R-Squared: .757 
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Table 12.   Regional Proficiency Interest (1st SFG(A)) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (3
rd
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 










Number of Observations: 95 R-Squared: .732 
Table 13.   Regional Proficiency Interest (3rd SFG(A)) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (5
th
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 










Number of Observations: 65 R-Squared: .798 
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Table 14.   Regional Proficiency Interest (5th SFG(A)) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (7
th
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 










Number of Observations: 75 R-Squared: .714 
Table 15.   Regional Proficiency Interest (7th SFG(A)) 
 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (10
th
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Experience in SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Command Environment Value 
Interest in Advise and Assist Value 
Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Regional Competence Utility 
Rank Value 











Number of Observations: 137 R-Squared: .717 
Table 16.   Regional Proficiency Interest (10th SFG(A)) 
 
3. Warrior-Diplomat Score 
Warrior Diplomat Score (Total SF) Coef R > t  
Value of Rank 
Experience In SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Commando Score 
Training Value 
Command Environment Value 









Number of Observations: 502 R-Squared: .34 
Table 17.   Warrior-Diplomat Score (Total SF) 
 
 
Warrior Diplomat Score (1
st
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Value of Rank 
Experience In SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Commando Score 
Training Value 









Interest in Advise and Assist Value .329 .000 
Number of Observations: 502 R-Squared: .34 
Table 18.   Warrior-Diplomat Score (1st SFG(A)) 
 
 
Warrior Diplomat Score (3
rd
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Value of Rank 
Experience In SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Commando Score 
Training Value 
Command Environment Value 









Number of Observations: 97 R-Squared: .379 
Table 19.   Warrior-Diplomat Score (3rd SFG(A)) 
 
Warrior Diplomat Score (5
th
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Value of Rank 
Experience In SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Commando Score 
Training Value 









Interest in Advise and Assist Value .358 .000 
Number of Observations: 66 R-Squared: .511 
Table 20.   Warrior-Diplomat Score (5th SFG(A)) 
 
Warrior Diplomat Score (7
th
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Value of Rank 
Experience In SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Commando Score 
Training Value 
Command Environment Value 









Number of Observations: 77 R-Squared: .33 
Table 21.   Warrior-Diplomat Score (7th SFG(A)) 
 
 
Warrior Diplomat Score (10
th
 SFG(A)) Coef R > t  
Value of Rank 
Experience In SF Value 
Time In AOR Value 
Time Outside AOR Value 
Commando Score 
Training Value 









Interest in Advise and Assist Value .290 .000 
Number of Observations: 138 R-Squared: .359 




When reading the regression analysis for incentives, there are several important 
considerations to bear in mind.  First, command environment was added as an 
independent variable since, like an incentive, it is a variable that could be adjusted by the 
command to increase interest in regional proficiency.  This leads to the next 
consideration.  It is important to bear in mind the tenses used in the questions.  Regional 
proficiency and command environment were values derived from the present situation.  
Therefore, a positive relation means that it is likely that a high command environment 
means there will also be a high interest in regional proficiency.  The phrasing for the 
incentive questions were for a hypothetical future (i.e., “I would improve my knowledge, 
if…”).  This comes into play when negative relations are found between interest in 
regional proficiency and an incentive.  This negative relation does not mean that the 
incentive has a negative effect on interest in regional proficiency.  Rather, the negative 
relation means that a person with a high interest in regional proficiency would likely rate 
the incentive lower.  Conversely, a person with a lower interest in regional proficiency 
would rate the incentive higher.    
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Regional Proficiency Interest 6.24 1.15 
Command Environment Value 4.57 1.63 
PDSI 2.63 1.69 
Promotion 3.22 1.73 
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Pay  3.78 1.81 
College Credit 3.89 1.73 
ODA Time 5.17 1.69 
AOR Time 4.44 1.87 
No Incentive 4.88 2.17 
 
Table 23.   Incentive Descriptive Statistics (Total SF) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (Total SF) Coef R > t  














Number of Observations: 376 R-Squared: .108 
Table 24.   Incentive Regression Analysis (Total SF) 
 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Regional Proficiency Interest 6.29 .99 
Command Environment Value 4.41 1.62 
PDSI 2.54 1.60 
Promotion 2.92 1.62 
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Pay  4.36 1.82 
College Credit 4.45 1.65 
ODA Time 5.04 1.67 
AOR Time 4.18 2.00 
No Incentive 4.51 2.29 
 
Table 25.   Incentive Descriptive Statistics (SFODA Member) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (SFODA Member) Coef R > t  














Number of Observations: 98 R-Squared: .252 
Table 26.   Incentive Regression Analysis (SFODA Member) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Regional Proficiency Interest 6.21 1.14 
Command Environment Value 4.48 1.68 
PDSI 2.67 1.69 
Promotion 3.03 1.54 
Pay  3.77 1.92 
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College Credit 4.06 1.82 
ODA Time 5.40 1.71 
AOR Time 4.39 1.79 
No Incentive 4.68 2.13 
Table 27.   Incentive Descriptive Statistics (SFODA Leader) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (SFODA Leader) Coef R > t  














Number of Observations: 121 R-Squared: .165 
Table 28.   Incentive Regression Analysis (SFODA Leader) 
 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Regional Proficiency Interest 6.21 1.15 
Command Environment Value 4.48 1.68 
PDSI 2.67 1.69 
Promotion 3.03 1.54 
Pay  3.77 1.92 
College Credit 4.06 1.82 
 155 
ODA Time 5.40 1.71 
AOR Time 4.39 1.79 
No Incentive 4.68 2.13 
Table 29.   Incentive Descriptive Statistics (Company Leader) 
 
Regional Proficiency Interest (Company Leader) Coef R > t  














Number of Observations: 90 R-Squared: .208 
Table 30.   Incentive Regression Analysis (Company Leader) 
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